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Well they passed a law in '64
To give those who ain't got a little more.
But it only goes so far
Because the law don't change another's mind
When all it sees at the hiring time
Is the line on the color bar.
That's just the way it is
Some things will never change
That's just the way it is
But don't you believe them. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

A celebration? A vigil? A wake? In 1994, how should one have
observed the thirtieth anniversary of the enactment of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 the oldest of the federal employment
discrimination laws?3 In the years bracketing the anniversa
ry-1993 and 1 995-the United States Supreme Court decided two
cases that escalate the ongoing subordination of Title VII and other
federal employment discrimination laws to a much older legal
doctrine.
On one side are power, property, and prerogative-the ultimate
manifestation of which is the legal doctrine known as employment
at will. On the other side are the federal statutes and policies
prohibiting discrimination in employment based on specified
invidious characteristics.4 The two contending forces have waged

1 BRUCE R. HORNSBY, The Way It Is, on THE WAY IT IS (RCA Records 1986).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3 See Major Impact of Title VII ls Cited as Seminar Marks 30-Year Anniversary, DAILY
LAB. REP., June 28, 1994, at C-1 to C-3 (recounting efforts of civil rights litigators in
development of EEO movement).

4 I use "federal employment discrimination law" to refer primarily to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), § 1981, 42 U.S. C.
§ 1981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (Supp. V 1993). There are, of course, other federal statutes prohibiting employment
discrimination, but I am most concerned in this Article with the erosion of the disparate
treatment theory as it applies to the foregoing statutes.
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war before the Court since 1964.5

Because employment at will

often is referred to by one of its many aliases, such as management
prerogatives, it has not always been recognized. In the beginning,
one might have predicted that employment at will, a common-law
doctrine, would be overmatched when opposing the employment
discrimination statutes, which are positive law enacted by Con
gress, and the strong public policy that is embodied in those
statutes.6

This perception, however, has proven to be wrong.
Employment at will now has won so many battles before the
Supreme Court that the war may almost be over.7
Although some may hold out hope that Congress again will take

5

Title VII was originally passed in 1964. Prior to that time, employment at will battled

and routed another piece of federal labor law: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C.

§§

151-69 (1988).

See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text (discussing

subordination of NLRA's statutory rights to employment at will).
6

See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A

Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 70 (1990) ("At first blush, it
seems almost inherently inconsistent to speak of the survival of common-law economic and
political premises in light of a statutory scheme which, while stopping short of requiring just
cause for discharge, is an undoubted encroachment on the doctrine of employment at will."
(footnotes omitted)).
7

In recent years, several scholars have questioned the continued viability of Title VII as

a weapon for combatting employment discrimination and achieving equal opportunity in
employment. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 386 (1995) (arguing Title VII, as interpreted and
enforced, is no match in battle for civil rights against forces that have limited employment
opportunities of African Americans); see also D. Marvin Jones, No Time for Trumpets: Title
VII, Equality, and the Fin De Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2311, 2318 (1994) ("Title VII is the
juridical equivalent of the last fading smile of a Cheshire cat of social justice that has long
since disappeared.").

Professor Rutherglen, in a recent essay, questioned whether the

concept of "discrimination" has been stretched so far beyond its commonly understood
meaning that prohibitions of discrimination alone no longer can effectively redress the
various manifestations of inequality in employment. George Rutherglen Discri mination and
,

Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117, 139-40 (1995).
In a 1991 article, Professors John Donohue and Peter Siegelman described

an

ongoing

battle between two opposing forces that would determine the future of civil rights in
employment in the United States. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983 (1991). Donohue
and Siegelman identify the United States Congress as the champion of the side favoring
expansion of federal power to eliminate discrimination. Id. They do not identify a champion
of the side working for the "relax[ation] or trim[ming] [of the] federal civil rights law," but
they do state that the group looks to the United States Supreme Court to effect that result.
Id. I suggest that Hicks and McKennon indicate that the Court has hearkened the pleas of
that group and taken on the mantle as its champion.
accompanying text (discussing Hicks and McKennon).

See infra notes 183-396 and
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up the banner of employment discrimination and do battle with the
Court, those hopes are probably unfounded. Congress sought to
turn back the Court's assault on federal employment discrimination
law by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,8 in which Congress
attempted to overturn several Supreme Court decisions restricting
the federal statutes' protections against discrimination. 9 Despite
that response by the legislative branch, the Court has not retreat
ed; instead, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks10 and McK.ennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. ,11 it redoubled its efforts by
launching a frontal assault on the stronghold of employment
discrimination law-the disparate treatment theory. Moreover,
although past Congresses have championed federal employment
discrimination law, the current Congress does not ride under that
banner.12
In 1993, the Court decided Hicks. In that case, the Court refined
or redefined (depending on your interpretation of precedent)13 the
analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green14 for
disparate treatment cases under Title VII. The Court held that a
plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the plain
tiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and proves that
the defendant's articulated reason for the employment action it took
against the plaintiff is pretextual. 15
Then, in January 1995, the Court rendered its long-awaited
decision in McKennon. In that case, the Court rejected the rule
adopted in Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

8 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
principally in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96 ("[T)he Civil Rights Act of 1991() has two primary purposes. The

first is to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights protections
that were dramatically limited by those decisions.").
See infra notes 173-182 and
accompanying text (discussing 1991 Civil Rights Act as response to Court's assault on
employment discrimination law).
10 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
11 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
12 See infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's failure to overturn

Hicks).
13 See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (comparing majority's interpretation
of precedent in Hicks with dissent's interpretation).
14 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
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Co. 16 regarding after-acquired evidence. 17 Under the Summers
treatment of after-acquired evidence, such evidence of wrongdoing
by an employee, for which the employee would have been fired (or
not hired), barred the plaintiff from being awarded any remedy in
an employment discrimination action. Although at first blush
McKennon appears to be a victory for victims of employment
discrimination, it is a Pyrrhic victory: the Court in McKennon went
on to hold that after-acquired evidence can be relevant to limit the
remedies available to a plaintiff who proves employment discrimi
nation.18

Although Hicks, a five-to-four decision, was widely viewed as a
devastating defeat for federal employment discrimination law,
McKennon, a unanimous decision, may not be seen as the defeat
that it is.19 I argue that McKennon is cut from the same cloth as
Hicks and prior cases subordinating employment discrimination law
to employment at will. I contend, however, that McKennon is, in

16

864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).

17

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (1995).
Id. at 886.
1 9 See Kenneth R. Davis, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: A Dubious Defense in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 22 PE PP . L. REV. 365, addendum (1995) (praising both
Court's rejection of Summers rule and its adoption of date-of-discovery approach to limiting
backpay-approach advocated by article); Adria S. Zeldin, Survey of Recent United States
Supreme Court Decisions on Employment Discrimination Law, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 921,
924 (1995) (characterizing Court's decision in McKennon as pro-plaintiff); Pamela M. Martey,
Note, "The Last Temptation is The Greatest Treason: To Do the Right Deed far the Wrong
Reason": Afet r-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Claims: McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1031, 1058-60 (1995) (arguing
18

Court's decision upholds policies of federal employment discrimination laws); 1993-94
B.C. L. REV. 305, 399 (1995) (asserting
Court's decision "upholds the legal rights of the employer . . . yet still provides appropriate
relief to victims of unlawful discrimination"); see also Samuel A. Mills, Note, Toward an
Eq uitable After-Acquired Evidence Rule, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1525 (1994) (advocating, prior
to McKennon, adoption of date-of-discovery limitation on backpay). But see Kenneth A.
Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's Cognitive Dissonance, 60 Mo. L.
REV. 89, 165 (1995) (praising Court's rejection of after-acquired evidence as complete defense,
but decrying Court's determination that such evidence is relevant to reduction of backpay);
George M. Sullivan & Edward J. Harrick, The Resolution of the After-Acquired Evidence
Controversy, 46 LAB L.J. 286, 287 (1995) (arguing that although decision "was widely
heralded as a resolution favoring employees, closer scrutiny reveals that the decision may
actually favor employers"); Labor Law: Attorney Finds Supreme Court More Pro-Employee
Than Appeals Courts, DAILY LAB REP., Mar. 16, 1995, at A-2 (discussing comments of AFL
CIO General Counsel Laurence Gold, who, while recognizing positive side of McKennon
decision for employees, stated "it's not clear who won the war").

Annual Survey of Labor and Employment Law, 36

.

.
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several ways, a more insidiously harmful decision for employment
discrimination law than is Hicks and a more blatant proclamation
that employment at will trumps employment discrimination law.
Moreover, theMcKennon Court's cavalier rejection of reinstatement
and potential limitation of backpay, the remedies crucial to
employment discrimination law's public policy objective, are
significant steps in a movement intimately related to the subordi
nation of discrimination law to employment at will: the privatiza
tion of employment discrimination law.20 If the Court continues
this campaign, the federal employment discrimination statutes will
be reduced to mere statutory tort actions. This characterization
renders them even more vulnerable to subordination to the
employment-at-will doctrine. The statutes will become just another
tort exception to employment at will.
Part II of this Article examines the contending forces in this war.
It posits that the power of employment at will should not be
surprising in view of the doctrine's conquest of an older federal law,
the National Labor Relations Act.21 Part III identifies the genesis
of the Supreme Court's subordination of federal employment
discrimination law to employment at will and traces the escalation
of this campaign from the late 1970s through the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Part III next discusses the Court's
surprising resumption of its relentless assault on discrimination
law after the enactment of the 1991 Act. It juxtaposes the Court's
decisions in Hicks andMcKennon and posits that each is part of the
ongoing and escalating subordination of federal employment
discrimination law to employment at will. Finally, Part IV looks to
the future of employment discrimination law and considers ways of
preventing the irreversible subjugation of discrimination law to
employment at will.

20 See Cheryl K. Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment

Discrimination Claims: The Privatization ofTitle VII and the Contours ofSocial Responsibil
ity, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 193-202 (1993) (arguing after-acquired evidence arose as part of
general recharacterization of Title VII as private tort remedy).
21 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-69 (1988).
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II. THE CONTENDING FORCES: THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL

DOCTRINE AND FEDERAL EMPWYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

An antidiscrimination law is the an tithesis of freedom of
contract, a principle that allows all persons to do busi
ness with whomever they please for good reason, bad rea 
22
son, or no reason at all.
A. POWER, PROPERTY, AND PREROGATIVE

"Bill," [said an assistant su perintendent} to a foreman
[early in the twentieth century}, "has anyone been fired
from this shop today?" "No," the foreman meekly replied.
''Well, then, fire a couple of 'em!" bark ed the assistant
superintendent, in a voice that carried. "It'll put the fear
of God in their hearts. 1123

The classic statement of the employment-at-will doctrine was
proclaimed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1884:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell
where they please, and to discharge or retain employe[
e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act
per se... .
. . . All may dismiss their employe[e]s at will, be they
many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of
legal wrong. 24
If one believes the recent scholarly writing, employment at will
is a once-mighty tyrant in labor and employment law that both is

22

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:

DISCRIMINATION LAWS
23

THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT

3 (1992).

SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY:

MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE

1900-1945, at 21 (1985).
24 Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds,
Hutton v. Wat�rs, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
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despised by many and is gradually losing its sovereignty.25
Indeed, the doctrine does seem to be beset on every side, with both
its lineage and pedigree being challenged26 and "exceptions" to the
doctrine being recognized in all jur isdictions with increasing
frequency. 27

25

Among the recognized exceptions are wrongful dis-

The academic assault on employment at will, and calls for limitations on the doctrine,

can be traced back to Professor Lawrence Blades's

1967 article, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404 (1967). Since the publication ofBlades's article, academic criticism of employment
at will has proliferated. See, e.g. , Theodore J. St. Antoine, Employment-at-Will-Is the Model
Act the Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 179, 180 n.6 (1993) (citing relevant articles). Professor
St. Antoine concludes that the common-law modifications of employment at will are
inadequate to protect most employees, and he urges state legislatures to adopt the Model
Employment Termination Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.

Id. passim.

The most vocal defender of employment at will in the academic community has been
Professor Richard Epstein.

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (discussing role of contract at will in employment relations).

Not surprisingly, Epstein also has been one of the harshest critics of employment
discrimination law.

See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 22 (arguing anti-discrimination law
Standing Firm, on Forbidden
Grounds, 31 SAN DIE GO L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing anti-discrimination law should not apply
to private employers in competitive markets); Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production
Sideshow: Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085
(1995) (criticizing Richard H. McAdams's Cooperation & Confl.ict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV . 1003 (1995), and arguing that
interferes with freedom of contract); Richard A. Epstein,

only repeal of civil rights laws will achieve key social aim of"minimiz[ing] the level of public
force in human affairs").
For a middle-ground view that employment at will should not be categorically maintained,
but neither should a general good cause condition for termination be recognized, see
generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (arguing courts in many cases are applying,
and should apply, life-cycle framework to protect both employers and employees from
opportunistic behavior).
26 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125-27 (1976) (criticizing treatise writer Horace Gay Wood's influential

proclamation of employment-at-will rule as not supported by cases Wood cited, as incorrectly
stating uniformity of application of rule in United States rather than contrary English rule,

But see Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The
Doubtful Provenance of -Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 558 (1990) (arguing
and as giving no policy rationale for rule).

Wood "just told it like it was").

See generally STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
2-4 (1993) (discussing exceptions to employment at will); Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance
Interest In Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614, 687-89 (1988) (discussing judicially recognized
27

chs.

exceptions to employment at will as examples of situations in which law transfers "limited
set of property interests from the employer to the employee [to] protect[] the reliance
interests of the more vulnerable party").

[Vol. 30:305
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infliction of
charge in violation of public policy,28 intentional
the coven ant
emotional distress 29 invas ion of privacy,30 breach of
ssory
of good faith and fair dealing,31 detrimental reliance or promi
ment
employ
estoppel,32 and implied-in-fact contr��ts.33 Although
and
at will may be "besieged" by recogn1t�on of common-I � to
lly,
contract theories of recovery as exceptions to the rule, 1romca
the hoary doctrin e is on the offensiv e against federal employment

,

.

.

!

z:t

discrimination law, rapidly regaini ng whatever territory w8:s once
taken from it by the federal statutes. Employment at will has
shown an uncommon common-law strength when pitted against
those laws. What is the source of that strength?
Several theories have been offered to explain the development
and adoption of employment at will in the United States.35
Regardless of the theory to which one subscribes, most scholars

28

E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Nees v.

Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
29

E.g., Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992); Boedwig v. K-Mart, Inc., 635

P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
30

E.g., Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1989); K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti,

677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
31

E.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Fortune v. National

Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
32

E.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).

33

E.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

34

I used "besieged" to capture the sense of the once impregnable principle being

challenged from all sides. Despite the advent of much-ballyhooed exceptions, employment
at will remains the default rule. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 27, at 3. E mployment at will,
while no longer invincible, still reigns over employment law. Professor Moller, surveying the
tort and contract incursions on employment at will, concludes that these changes have not
effected a major change in the law or a significant shift in the balance of power in the

workplace. Sid L. Moller, The Revolution That Wasn't: On the Busines� as Usual Aspects
of Employment at Will, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 441, 494-95 (1993).
35 For recent
scholarship surveying the theories and offering a new theory, see Andrew
P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessmen t of the Rise of
Employment at-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994). The theories considered and rejected
by
Professor Morriss include: the rule was a natural product of nineteenth century laissez
faire
capitalism; the rule was a tool with which capitalists exercised control over the
new middle
class of white collar workers; the rule resulted from less class prejudice and weaker
trade
unions � the United States than in Britain; and the rule sprang from the widely
read work
_
of treatise wnter Horace Wood. Id. at 681, 683-96. Morriss posits that employm
ent at will
was adopted by state courts to serve as a gatekeeper. Id. at 753. The courts
recognized that
ey lacked th� competence to eval�ate the termination decisions of employ
ers; thus, the at
will rule provided an easy solution, quickly disposi ng of employ
ment cases involvi ng
indefinite-term employment. Id.

�
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agree that the law's recognition of an employer's virtually unbridled
prerogative is based on common-law principles or baselines36
regarding property ownership

and freedom of contract:

the

workplace is the property of the employer, and in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, the employer may do as it wishes with
its property. 37 The employer should be free to use its property
without government interference38 because there is no public

36 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (analyzing
common-law baselines of constitutional analysis). Professor Sunstein uses the term
"baseline" to refer to the starting points or underlying assumptions that lead to formulation
of legal doctrine and rules. Id. Several scholars have adopted Sunstein's terminology and
approach to examine the baselines for the employment-at-will doctrine. E.g., Jack M.
Beermann & Joseph W. Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of
Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 914-15 (1989); Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 66;
Jones, supra note 7, at 2324 n.36.
37 JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND AsSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 32-33, 91-94
(1983); Beermann & Singer, supra note 36, at 936-56; Blades, supra note 25, at 1416-19;
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 66-70; Jones, supra note 7, at 2316-17, 2350; Karl E.
Klare, The Public I Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1366-67 (1982);
Peter Linzer, The Decline ofAssent: At- Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown
of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 375 (1986); Singer, supra note 27, at 633-37. In
his defense of employment at will, Professor Epstein argues that it maximizes freedom of
contract because it recognizes both "that the employer is the full owner of his capital and
[that] the employee is the full owner of his labor." Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, supra note 25, at 955; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 20-24 (defending the Lockean
position of self-ownership). Although Professor Epstein emphasizes the freedom-of-contract
rationale in support of employment at will, he clearly recognizes the important property law
foundation in employers' common-law prerogatives. See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law
for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 138889 (1983) (criticizing balancing tests for determining whether employer has violated§ 8(aX1)
of National Labor Relations Act by denying access to its property as "cut[ting] back upon the
absolute power to exclude that is the hallmark of any system of private property").
In the debate over passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, opponents argued that the Act
would "infringe[] upon the rights of private property and the rights of American citizens to
choose their associates." 110 CONG. REC. 4744 (1964) (ststement of Sen. Russell). The
Congressional Record is rife with similar statements by opponents of the Civil Rights Act.
E.g., id. at 4762 ("I am opposed to telling businessmen how they may use their private
property and whom they may hire and fire.") (statement of Sen. Hill). See generally Samuel
A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights,
9 NOT RE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 137, nn.31-34 (1995) (discussing and quoting from
debate over passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
38 Professors Blumoff and Lewis postulate that the Court, as constituted during the
"Reagan Revolution," is committed to common-law baselines of neutrality and noninter
ference. Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 67-70. Blumoff and Lewis, concurring with
Sunstein, trace the judicial imprimatur on these principles to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). Id.; see also Jones, supra note 7, at 2354 (arguing that, under traditional preroga
tives of employers, "[t]he employer's liberty to be free in his domain of any constraints

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

316

[Vol. 30:305

interest in the employment relationships between a private
emp1oyer and"its emp1oyees.39
Professor Klare has identified three types of rights and powers
that usually are associated with property ownership: the power to
exclude; the right of privacy; and use of the workplace (including
the right to manage the work process and to make investment
.

decisions).40 Thus, the power to terminate for any reason is not
the only employer right based on the employer's ownership of the
It is, however, the quintessential expression of
workplace.
employer prerogative,41 and from the employee's perspective, it is
the most important one. 42 The termination power of the employer
is part of the power to exclude others from its property.43 Con

versely, exceptions to employment at will infringe on the employer's
property right to exclude; thus, they result in a transfer of a part
of the employer's property rights to the employee.44
Employment at will, steeped as it is in property and contract law

principles, has garnered support from economic theorists, who view
it as promoting efficiency in several ways. 45

First, economic

theorists see the power to exclude others, and the assurance that
the government will not intervene to prevent such exclusion, as
inducing owners of property to invest and put their resources to

anchors a notion that in the employer's domain he should be free of the government's
intruding gaze").
39

Linzer, supra note

37,

at

375; Singer, supra note

27, at

633-34.

One Senate opponent

of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act argued that Title VII "would be an unwarranted
invasion of private enterprise and private property rights." UO CONG. REC. 5093 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Robertson).
'°Klare, supra note 37, at 1367-71.
41 Cf. Jones, supra note 7, at 2343 n.llO ("Of course, the traditional prerogative of the
employer was to be free from all constraints on who to hire and fire.").
.
.
42 Ternunat on from emp loyment has been described as "a kind
1
of organizational
equivalent of capital punishment." WILBERT E. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION

28 (1962).

43 Singer, supra note 27, at 688-89 .
44 Id". Professor Singer argues that such a transfer is justified because it protects
the
reliance mterests of the more vulnerable party in the relationship of employmen
t. Id. at 68889; see also Be�rmann & Singer, supra note 36, at 947-56 (discussing property rights as an
.
allocat1on
of nghts between parties in relationship, occasionally to protect
needs of less
powerful party).
•

45 E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 22, ch. 8; Epstein,
In Defense of the Contract at Will supra
note 25, at 965-67; Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause
for Terminatio Rules
_
& Economic
Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, ll44 (1989).

�
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Second, they argue that unlimited managerial

discretion gives employees, who are risk averse, incentive to be pro
ductive and thus makes workers more productive. 47
Third,
employers who abuse the doctrine (that is, act opportunistically)
suffer greater reputational losses than employees who act opportun
istically; thus, there are informal constraints on an employer's
Fourth, employment at will
abuse of employment at will.48
discourages employees from investing too much in a single job and
thus encourages them to diversify and make better choices as they
obtain more information about employers.49 Finally, employment
at will is inexpensive to administer.50
In view of the common-law baselines undergirding employment
at will and the efficiency arguments urging resistance to change,
employment at will does not appear as feeble as the flurry of
exceptions being recognized would lead one to believe. Moreover,
an additional factor is likely causing courts to cling to employment
at will as the basic principle governing the employment relation
ship. Courts do not wish to become generally involved in evaluat
ing employers' discharge decisions. Professor Morriss has argued
that employment at will originally was adopted by courts in the
United States as a gatekeeper rule because courts did not deem
themselves competent to evaluate the performance of discharged
employees, and he thinks this institutional problem persists
today.51 There is evidence that he is correct: the Supreme Court
has admonished courts in employment discrimination cases to avoid
second-guessing employers' business practices because of the courts'
relative incompetence in that area.52

46 Beermann & Singer, supra note 36, at 925 (discussing management arguments against
job security); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
356 (1967); Stephen J. Massey, Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J.
541, 557-58 (1984).
47 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 965; Beermann & Singer,
supra note 36, at 926.
48 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 967-68; Beermann &
Singer, supra note 36, at 926.
49 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 968-69; Beermann &
Singer, supra note 36, at 926-27.
50 Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 25, at 970-73; Beermann &
Singer, supra note 36, at 927.
51 Morr1ss, supra note 35, at 713, 752-53, 762-63.
5 2 See infra notes 136-172 and accompanying text (discussing Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
.
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SUBORDINATION OF STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT TO EMPLOYERS' COMMON-LAW PREROGATIVES

The Supreme Court's subordination of employment discrimina
tion law to employment at will is developed more fully below.53
This section, however, concentrates on what a formidable foe
employment at will has proven to be for the other federal labor law
that threatened its empire. The Supreme Court's subordination of
federal labor and employment law to the property-based preroga
tives of the employer is forcefully demonstrated by the elevation of
the employer's property rights over the rights of employees under
the National Labor Relations Act54 (NLRA).55

In discussing the
common-law exceptions to employment at will,56 Professor Klare
points out that these developments are evidence that the employ
ment relationship is no longer treated as wholly private.57 Klare
notes the "curious twist" that, notwithstanding the recognition that
the employment relationship is not entirely private, courts have
relied on private-law principles to dilute statutory guarantees
under the NLRA. 58
One of the most controversial issues under the NLRA has been
nonemployee union organizers' right of access to an employer's
private property to organize employees as part of a union-organiz
ing campaign. In its decision in Jean Country,59 the National
Labor Relations Board developed a test that sought to balance the

Waters, 438 U.S. 567 ( 1978), and Court's admonition therein and thereafter about judicial
incompetence to second-guess employers).

Moreover, the gatekeeper rule not only helps

courts avoid the types of cases they are ill-equipped to address, but also decreases their

overall caseload. There has been an increasing trend in the federal courts to use summary

judgment to prune the dockets, and employment discrimination claims have become
increasingly susceptible to such judicial action. Robert J. Gregory, The Use ofAfter-Acquired
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free?, 9 LAB.
LAW. 43, 66-67 (1993).
53 See infra notes 126-396 and accompanying text (discussing Court's subordination of
discrimination laws to employment at will).
54 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-69 ( 1988).
SS
ATLESON, supra note 37, at 32, 91-94; Klare, supra note 37, at 1403-05.
56 See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (listing common-law
exceptions to
employment-at-will doctrine).
57 Klare, supra note 37, at 1362-63.
58 Id. at 1364.
59 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
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statutory rights of employees (to learn of organizational opportuni
ties) with the private property rights of the employer.60 The
Supreme Court rejected the Board's test in 1992 in Lechmere, Inc.

NLRB.61 The majority opinion stressed the property rights of
the employer and generally denied access.62
The relationship between management prerogatives and statuto
ry rights under the NLRA also is manifested by an employer's right
to hire permanent replacements for employees engaged in an
economic strike. The Supreme Court recognized this right in NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. 63
Many commentators have
argued against the "Mackay doctrine" on the ground that recogni
v.

tion of such a right eviscerates the right to strike guaranteed by
section 7 of the NLRA.64 Notwithstanding such criticism, numer

ous attempts to overturn Mackay through legislation have failed,65
and the doctrine has prevailed since 1938.

The current Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board

believes that both Lechmere and Mackay are contrary to the
purposes of the NLRA.

Responding to a letter from Republican

members of the House Economic and Educational Opportunities
Committee expressing concern regarding his public statements

60

Id. at 13-14.
502 U.S. 527 ( 1992). See Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property and Sovereignty After
Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1994) (criticizing Lechmere Court's expansive conception
of property rights and restrictive conception of employees' § 7 rights).
62
502 U.S. at 535-41. The Court recently decided a related issue, dealing with the
relationship between rights created by the NLRA and the employer's property right to
exclude, in NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 ( 1995). The Court
unanimously held that applicants for jobs who are also paid union organizers are
"employees" within the meaning of the NLRA. Id. at 457. Thus, it can be an unfair labor
practice to refuse to hire such an applicant because she is a paid union organizer. The Town
& Country decision is somewhat surprising after Lechmere .
63 304 U.S. 333 ( 1938).
64 E.g. , Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 300
( 199 1) (arguing Mackay doctrine "makes a mockery of the supposed right to strike"); see also
Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL.
L. REV. 547, 567 (asserting that, because of Mackay, "resort to the statutory 'right' to strike
would be, for many employees, an exercise in permanent job loss, and for the union, an act
of potential self-immolation").
65 See William R. Corbett, A Proposal for Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent
Striker Replacements: "A Far, Far Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 8 13, 827 n.74 ( 1994) (chronicling history of unsuccessful legislative attempts to
overrule Mackay doctrine).
61
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advocating reform of the striker replacement law embodied in
Mackay, Chairman William Gould stated, "I continue to believe
that both Lechmere and Mackay are bad law and inconsistent wi th

the basic purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, but I am
committed to the impartial administration of the law as interprete d
by the Supreme Court. "66
Still, in terms of the Supreme Court's flouting of congressional
intent, the subordination of employees' statutory rights under th e
NLRA to employers' common-law prerogatives is not as egregious
as the subordination ofemployees' rights under federal employment
discrimination law. Although many commentators believe the
Supreme Court's decisions in Mackay and Lechmere are contrary to
the intent and purpose of the NLRA, Congress, by failing to enact
legislation to overturn those decisions and return the law to what
it intended, has not evidenced a similar belief.67 In contrast,
Congress, through passage of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, respond
ed to the Court's subordination of rights under employment
discrimination law.
Employment at will does not give up territory in its kingdom
without a fight. The experience with the NLRA, the first federal
law to attempt to claim some of that territory, reveals that the
courts pay homage to the common-law doctrine. The story has been
no different with federal employment discrimination law.
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

C.

The anti-employment discrimination laws are suffused
with a public aura for reasons that are well known . . . .
Congress has responded to . . . pernicious misconceptions
and ignoble hatreds with humanitarian laws formulated

68

Letter from William B. Gould IV, Chairman, the National Labor Relations Board to

Reps. Bill Goodling, Harris Fawell, and Pete Hoekstra (Apr. 19, 1995), reprinted in
LAB.
67

REP., Apr. 20, 1995,

D�LY

at E-1 to E-4.

Several bills introduced in Congress in the late 1980s and 1990s that would have

overturned or modified Mackay failed. Even had one passed, Mackay's survival since 1938
arguably suggests that Congress did not find the case to be such an affront as to require
immediate action. Moreover, many interpret the amendment of the NLRA by the Landrum
Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 ( 1959), as ratifying Mackay.
Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287, 289 (1987).

E.g. ,

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

1996]

321

to wipe out the iniquity of discrimination in employment,
not merely to recompense the individuals so harmed but
principally to deter future violations.
The anti-employment discrimination laws Congress en
acted consequently resonate with a forceful public policy
8
vilifying discrimination. 6
The effusive and eloquent passage above is representative of
what both C ongress and the courts, including the Supreme Court,
have said about federal employment discrimination law. The grand
and all-encompassing goal of the statutes is self-evident:

to

eradicate discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex,
How is such a
religion, national origin, age, or disability. 69
complex goal to be achieved?
Both Congress and the courts have responded by breaking the
larger goal down into two more functional objectives toward which
the law historically has been directed. In enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 , Congress stated that one of the two primary purposes
of the Act was to strengthen protections and remedies "to provide

more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of
discrimination."70

In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 71 the Su

preme Court declared the purposes of Title VII to be deterrence of
employment discrimination and "make whole" compensation for the
victims of discrimination. 72

The Court also paid lip service to

these purposes in McKennon, noting, "Deterrence is one object of
[the ADEA and Title VII]. Compensation for injuries caused by the
prohibited discrimination is another."73

68 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 3 1 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted
and judgment vacated , 1 1 5 S. Ct. 1397 (1995).
69

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 239 1-2394 (stating purpose and reasoning behind Civil Rights Act of
1964); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 ( 1995)
(noting common purpose of ADEA and Title VII of eliminating workplace discrimination);
Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology:

The Wages of Sin Is Now Exeulpation, 28

CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 940 n.4 (1995) (citing sources stating goal of Title VII).
70

H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.2, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991

U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694.

The other primary goal was to overturn several Supreme Court

decisions that "dramatically limited" civil rights protections. Id.
71
72

422 U.S. 405 (1975).
Id. at 416-19.

73

McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 884.
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Still unanswered, however, is a vital question: What is discrimi
nation? What are these humanitarian laws to eradicate? What
acts are they to deter? For what injurious acts by employers are
those who are statutorily protected to be compensated? Title VII
does not define discrimination.74 Although stating that it is an
unlawful employment practice to take adverse employment action
"because of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, o r national
origin,"75 the Act neither provides guidance as to what a plaintiff
must prove to establish a violation76 nor defines those troublesome
words "because of."77 Rather, Congress left the interpretation of
what constitutes prohibited discrimination to the courts, which
subsequently developed two principal theories of recovery under
Title VII: disparate treatment78 and disparate impact. 79 These

74 Jones, supra note 7, at 2345 ("Discrimination, the core evil to be addressed, is a figure

entirely unformed within the empty space framed by the statute."); Rutherglen, supra note
7, at 127; Turner, supra note 7, at 409.
75

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

76
11

Jones, supra note 7, at 2345.

See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Miud
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 22 ( 1991) (explain
ing that defining prohibited discrimination hinges on interpreting phrase "because of').
78

Disparate treatment theory is also recognized as a theory of recovery under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
§ 1981. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA

TION 91-92 (3d ed. 1994) (stating ADEA and Title VII adopt same definition of disparate
treatment); id. at 140-41 (stating that Supreme Court has adopted unified approach to
individual disparate treatment cases under Title VII, § 1981, and ADEA); see also Ennis v.

National Ass'n of Business & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing
disparate treatment theory under ADA and using proof structure found under Title VII and

ADEA); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
79 The initial judicial recognition of disparate impact under Title VII and the subsequent

codification of that theory of recovery are discussed infra note 105.
statutorily recognized under the ADA.

Disparate impact is

42 U.S.C. § 121 12(b)(3)(A), (b)(6) (Supp. V 1993).

Impact theory is not available under § 1981. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylva
nia, 458 U.S. 375, 388 ( 1 982).

Some federal courts have either held or assumed that

disparate impact theory is available under the ADEA. E.g. , Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d
953 (8th Cir. 1994); Fisher v. Transo Servs.-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1992).
The continuing authority of those decisions is dubious, however, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 1701 ( 1993). Although the Court
in Biggins did not hold that disparate impact is inapplicable to ADEA actions, the Court's
reasoning suggests this result. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit relied on Biggins in holding
(somewhat ambiguously) that disparate impact is not available as a theory of recovery under
the ADEA. EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1 15
S. Ct. 2577 (1995).

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Francis W. Parker School,

notwithstanding the EEOC's petition urging the Court to reverse the Seventh Circuit. Age
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two theories flesh out the prohibited discriminatory practices.
A plaintiff asserting a disparate treatment claim attempts to
prove that an employer has treated her less favorably than others
because of her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability. 80 A plaintiff proceeding under a disparate treatment
theory must prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory
motive or animus. 81 The plaintiff can attempt to prove his case by
offering either direct evidence of discrimination, such as explicit
statements or "smoking gun" memos, or by indirect or circum
stantial evidence.82 Usually, employers, aware of the potential for
lawsuits under federal employment discrimination law, do not give
plaintiffs the luxury of relying on direct evidence.83 Accordingly,

Discrimination: Justices Will Not Review Use of Disparate Impact in ADEA Cases, DAILY
LAB. REP., June 20, 1995, at E 1 to E-2.
80 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Most
disparate treatment cases are individual disparate treatment cases. A second type of
disparate treatment case, the pattern-or-practice or systemic disparate treatment case,
resembles, in some respects, a disparate impact case. In such a case, a plaintiff attempts to
show that an employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of intentionally discriminatory
decisions which have resulted in a lower representation of the protected group members in
the employer's work force than would have resulted had the employer made decisions
randomly without regard to the protected characteristic. See Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical
Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies," 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 479 (1993)
(examining issues of pattern-or-practice disparate treatment and statistical analysis therein);
Turner, supra note 7, at 436-44 (same); see also ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 78, at 492-502
(discussing distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact theories with
respect to statistical analyses involved). Another type of systemic disparate treatment case
involves an employer's maintenance of a formal facially discriminatory policy. See ZIMMER
ET AL., supra note 78, at 193-210. Although both the disparate impact and the systemic
disparate treatment theories address systemic discrimination, it is important to distinguish
them. The systemic disparate treatment case requires a finding of intentional discrimina
tion, whereas the disparate impact case does not. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 78, at 492-93.
Moreover, business necessity is a defense to a disparate impact claim, but not to a disparate
treatment claim. Id. at 493 (citing § 703(kX2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(kX2) (Supp. V 1993)). Furthermore, the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
authorizing awards of compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials in cases in which
such damages are sought applies to only actions alleging "unlawful intentional discrimination
(not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(l) (Supp. V 1993).
81 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
82 See BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15 (2d
ed. 1983) (identifying three types of evidenc�irect, statistical, and comparative-as those
available to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases); Turner, s upra note 7, at 432-33
(demonstrating differences between direct and indirect evidence of discrimination).
83 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 82, at 15; Turner, supra note 7, at 432.
-
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Green,84 the Supreme Court

developed a framework, consisting of three parts, by which courts
analyze circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases. 85
Under the analysis, a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination in a case involving failure to hire or pro
1) the plaintiff belongs to a
mote by proving the following:
protected class; 2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job
at issue; 3) despite the plaintiff's qualifications, the employer
rejected him; and 4) after the employer rejected the plaintiff, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applications from persons with qualifications similar to those of
plaintiff. 86 If a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, a rebuttable

M
86

411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The McDonnell Douglas analysis apparently does not apply to cases in which plaintiffs

present direct evidence of discrimination. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 1 1 1,
1 1 2 ( 1985). In an ironic twist, some argue that, in the aftermath of St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. 2742 ( 1 993), a plaintiff proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas analysis

E.g. , The Suprem€ Court, 1992
Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 348 ( 1 993) [hereinafter The Supreme
Court-Leading Cases] ("Despite Justice Scalia's protestations to the contrary, Hicks effec

cannot prevail without direct evidence of discrimination.

tively requires the plaintiff to show direct evidence of intent." (footnote omitted)); see also
Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption,
26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 1001 n.12 (1994) (citing lower court decisions interpreting Hicks as
requiring direct evidence of discriminatory intent); cf. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The majority's scheme greatly disfavors Title VII plaintiffs without the good
luck to have direct evidence of discriminatory intent."). Hicks does not explicitly impose such
a requirement, and I think such an interpretation reads too much into the Court's opinion.

See Brookins, supra note 69, at 965-66 (asserting Hicks does not explicitly or implicitly
impose such requirement and that it does not exist "if one can still rely on the Court's own
precedent").
A different analysis applies to disparate treatment cases involving so-called mixed motives.
The Court adopted the analysis for Title VII cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 ( 1989). See infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text. The mixed-motives analysis
was modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) & § 2000e-5(gX2XB)
(Supp. V 1993). For a discussion of differences and similarities between the McDonnell
Douglas and mixed-motives analyses, see Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1237
(4th Cir. 1995).
The Court was quick to point out that the
86 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
elements of the prima facie case will vary depending on the facts. Id. at 802 n.13. For
example, the Court in McDonnell Douglas actually stated as the first element of the prima
facie case that the plaintiff must establish "that he belongs to a racial minority." Id. at 802.
The Court explained in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 ( 1976), a case
involving white plaintiffs, that McDonnell Douglas did not restrict Title VII to racial
minorities. Rather, " 'specification . . . ofthe prima facie proof required . . . is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.'

"

McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 n.6
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presumption of intentional discrimination arises. 87 The Court
bases this presumption on the rationale that the prima facie case
eliminates the two most common legitimate reasons for not hiring
a person: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications and a lack
of an opening for the position being sought. 88 If the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment action. 89 If the employer satisfies its burden, the
plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove that the employer's
articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. 90 The ultimate
burden of persuasion that the employer intentionally discriminated
remains with the plaintiff at all times.91
A plaintiff asserting a disparate impact theory of recovery asserts
that a facially neutral employment practice (such as a job skills
test) has a significantly disproportionate adverse effect on a group
protected by the laws and that the practice cannot be justified by
"business necessity."92 In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff
offers statistical evidence to establish that the protected class to
which the plaintiff belongs is underrepresented in the employer's
work force in comparison with a relevant labor force from which the
employer hires or could hire. 93
Several important distinctions exist between the two theories.
First, individual disparate treatment is a narrow theory of recov
ery94 that focuses on adverse decisions regarding the particular
employee and turns on the "motive" of the decisionmaker, thus

(quoting

McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802 n.13).

Furthermore, the elements vary

depending on the type of a dverse employment action taken.
87 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
88

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.

324, 358 n.44 (1977).
89

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (detailing

employer's burden of production).
90

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,

2752 (1993).

91 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
92

Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. "Business necessity" has been redefined several times

by the Supreme Court and Congress since it was first articulated by the Court. The current
definition is set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(kX1XAXi} (Supp.
V 1993). The ADA uses the same definition. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX6) (Supp. V 1993).
93
94

Browne, supra note 80, at 482-83; Turner,
Turner, supra note 7, at 431.

supra note 7, at 444-45.
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making it what has been termed a subjective, fault-based theory.95
Disparate impact theory, in contrast, is an expansive theory,96
focusing on a practice or procedure rather than on decisions
regarding a particular employee, and under which motive is said to

be irrelevant, 97 making it a theory of liability based on an objec
tive view of fault. 98 Second, statistical evidence may be useful in
a disparate treatment case, but such evidence is vital to a disparate
impact case.99 Third, disparate treatment adopts the perspective
of the perpetrator and demands that a specific violation be identi
100
fied,
whereas disparate impact adopts the perspective of the
101
The final
victim and looks for overall patterns of inequality.
distinction between the two theories,

and perhaps

the most

important in terms of current controversies regarding employment
discrimination law, is that many view the disparate treatment
theory as attempting to achieve equality of opportunity and the
disparate impact theory as attem pting to achieve equality of
10
result. 2

95

Jones, supra note 7, at 2343 (describing contractarian model of fault, concerned with

what employer actually thought); see also Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural

Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary lnfiuences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370,
2375 (1994) (explaining that disparate treatment theory is premised on motivation of
employer and "conceptualize[s] discrimination as the outcome of discrete, biased acts of
individuals").
96 Turner, supra note 7, at 444.
97

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);

Blurnoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 13.
98

Jones, supra note 7, at 2342-43.

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) ("The evidence in these
'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific
incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities."); Browne, supra note 80, at
479 (noting statistical evidence may be central to disparate treatment case that targets
pattern or practice of intentional discrimination, but such evidence may not be sufficient or
99

necessary).

100 Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 126 (citing Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978)); see also Jones, supra note 7, at 2339
(decrying the paradigm of discrimination defining individual discriminatory decisions as evil
to be addressed and requiring proof of discriminatory animus as being "[an] outsider's
viewpoint [and] . . . the opposite of blacks' perspective").
101
Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 126.
102
Julie 0. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination Cases, 1 6 J.
CORP. L. 173, 175 (1991); Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 8. I recognize that many people
believe (and I am not disagreeing with them) that equality of opportunity cannot be achieved
through use of the disparate treatment theory alone.
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Disp arate treatment is generally accepted as a meaning of
discrimination that Congress intended to prohibit when it enacted
Title VII. As the Court has articulated, "[u]ndoubtedly disparate
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when
it enacted Title VII . . . . "103 Even Professor Epstein, who favors
repeal of federal employment discrimination law, admits that "a
practical com p romise" of limiting Title VII race cases to individual
disparate treatment claims "would honor the orig inal intentions of
the statute. "104
As Professor Epstein's grudging concession
suggests, he and others who acknowledge disparate treatment as
a meaning of discrimination that Congress intended to address in
Title VII, consider disparate imp act an unwarranted or undesirable
1
extension. 05
The princip al objections to disparate impact theory are based on
its lack of an intent requirement106 and its objective of ach ieving
equality of results. 107

Because employers have developed and

103 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see
alsu Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing core meaning of discrimination requires intent
to distinguish groups on basis of specified characteristics; consequently, disparate impact
theory does not fit easily within concept of discrimination); see also Calloway, supra nqte 85,
nt 997 (referring to disparate treatment as "the most basic form of discrimination");
Ch am al l as , supra note 95, at 2375 (calling disparate treatment "[t)he most well-established
theory of liability").
104 EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 181.
1 06 Disparate impact was recognized originally by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). There is considerable debate whether Congress, when it
1•nncted Title VII, intended to create such a theory of recovery. E.g. , EPSTEIN, supra note 22,
Al 184-201 (asserting Griggs represents "systematic distortion of the language and outlook"
of Title VII); Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin
of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for
/frform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985). Regardless of one's conclusion on that issue,
< '.on gre ss , in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified the disparate impact theory for Title VII
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. V 1993).
iQfl EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 160; Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 118. But see Jones, supra
note 7 , at 2343 (criticizing "mentalistic and subjective" concept of fault).
io:
See, e.g. , Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 14-15 (noting paradox inherent in
cl1!1parate impact theory that neutrality is equated with discrimination and discussing
p<-rception that requiring preferential treatment is type of discrimination, the very thing
p ro hib ite d by Title VII); Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 127-30 (pointing out that disparate
1 mpnct is itself "discrimination" under the ordinary meaning of the term). But see Jerome
�t Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The "lmpossibili
: v " of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 979 (1993) (criticizing "jurisprudence of
crlebration of the status quo as race neutral"); Jones, supra note 7, at 2340 (criticizing,.for
1 t.11 refusal to consider historical inequities, "relentless formalism" of view that affirmative
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implemented plans and strategies to avoid liability in disparate
impact cases, this theory is deemed the impetus for voluntary
1 8
Indeed, in
affirmative action plans, preferences, and quotas. 0
1
9
0
after the Supreme Court
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
announced that the disparate impact theory would be applied to

subjective criteria as well as objective criteria used to make employ
ment decisions, no a plurality of the Court quickly turned to the
problem of quota fear. To assuage employers' putative belief that
the extension of disparate impact would require implementation of
quota hiring, the plurality diluted the "business-necessity" defense,
styling it a "job-relatedness" defense, m and held that the burden
of persuasion on the business-necessity defense remained with the
112
plaintiff.
It has become increasingly fashionable in recent
times to excoriate affirmative action plans and other attempts to
eradicate the effects of past discrimination as, ironically, a type of
discrimination. 113 The distaste for affirmative action and dispa-

action is itself discrimination).
1 08
Allen et al., supra note 102, at 199 (describing affirmative action as attempt to avoid
liability for discrimination); Rutherglen, supra note 7, at 136-39 (describing relationship
between disparate impact and affirmative action); Turner, supra note 7, at 447-48 (same).
109
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
110
Id. at 991.
111
Id. at 997-98.
112
Id. at 998.
113
In June 1995, the Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2 1 1 7 ( 1995), held that federal affirmative action programs challenged on constitutional
grounds must be evaluated under a strict-scrutiny standard, and thus must serve a
compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored in order to be upheld. With
Adarand, the Court extended its holding in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.

469 (1989), which applied the same standard to state and local programs. In the aftermath
of Adarand, it seems that open season has been declared on affirmative action, and many
politicians have shown up for the hunt. During June 1995, House and Senate oversight
committees convened hearings to examine federal affirmative action plans. OFCCP Focus
of House, Senate Hearings in June, DAILY LAB. REP., June 12, 1995, at A-18; Affirmative

Action: Some Programs Will Fail Adarand Test, Patrick Tells House Oversight Panel, DAILY

LAB. REP., July 21, 1995, at AA-1 to AA-2. On July 20, 1995, the regents of the University
of California (including Governor Pete Wilson, then-presidential candidate for the Republican
party) voted to abolish affirmative action in hiring, contracting, and admissions at the nine
universities in the system. Affirmative Action: University of California Regents Ban
Affirmative Action in Hiring, Admissions, DAILY LAB. REP., July 24, 1995, at A 10 to A 1 1 .
One week later, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, another candidate for the Republican
nomination, and Representative Charles Canady introduced in the Senate and House, respec
tively, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, a bill that would prohibit race and gender
preferences in federal government programs. Affirmative Action: Dole, Canady Plan Early
-

-
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rate impact is largely traceable to beliefs that efforts to eliminate
discrimination should be rooted in colorblindness and equal
opportunity, notions which tend to secure the status quo.114
In view of the numerous objections to the disparate impact theory
and its association with the anathemas affirmative action and
quotas, it is not surprising that the Court, in its first major assault
on employment discrimination law, used its employment-at-will
weaponry to inflict the greatest damage on disparate impact.115
What is surprising, however, is that the Court's second major as
sault has targeted the disparate treatment theory, which embodies
a generally accepted meaning of discrimination under the federal
laws.116 Before moving to those battles, however, it is appropriate
to consider what the relationship between employment at will and
federal employment discrimination law should be.
D.

THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION LAW AND EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

Employment discrimination law must impinge on employment at
will to some extent.117 An employer can no longer fire an employ
ee (or take other adverse employment actions) for a good reason, a
bad reason, or no reason at all without potentially incurring liabili
ty. 118 Nevertheless, while some bad reasons will result in liabili
ty under employment discrimination law, those reasons are limited

Hearings on Bill to Eliminate Preferences, DAILY LAB. REP., July 28, 1995, at A-1.
114
See, e.g. , Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 74-75 & n.427 ("[T]he full implications of
disparate impact analysis appear to threaten the existing order, the regime of equal
opportunity and its principal metaphor of colorblindness.").
115
See infra notes 150-159, 169-172 and accompanying text (discussing this assault). The
Court's decisions exalting management prerogatives over federal employment discrimination
law were not limited to disparate impact cases. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567 (1978), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), for example, addressed
disparate treatment. It was in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988),
and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), however, that the Court ran
roughshod over disparate impact, rendering it virtually useless until the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
116
See supra note 103 (citing sources recognizing disparate treatment as most readily
accepted form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII).
117
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 7 1 ("The nearly absolute freedom that the employer
once enjoyed is gone.").
118
Id. at 70.
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119
to the discriminatory "because of' bases listed in the statutes.
Thus, federal employment discrimination law "operate[s] against
0
the presumed backdrop of at-will employment. "12
Although discrimination law makes only a limited formal
incursion on employment at will, it arguably does impinge more
significantly in an informal way. Employers who are sued under
a federal discrimination statute have their best chance of winning
if they can offer a good reason for their adverse employment
1 1
actions. 2 According to Professor Epstein, courts "will rightly be
skeptical" of an employer's assertion that it did not discriminate if
it offers no reason for its action, and in most cases, employers that
1
offer bad, but nondiscriminatory, reasons will not be believed. 22
This discussion of backdrops and slight incursions is only mildly
helpful because it raises the question of how great an incursion the
statutes should make. That question must be answered in a way
that provides some useful guidance in determining the appropriate
relationship in any given case.
If the laws are to have any
practical significance, they must displace employment at will to the
1
extent necessary to effectuate the goals of the laws. 23 As dis
cussed previously, the statutes' broad goal is to eliminate discrimi
nation in employment, while the functional objectives are to deter
discriminatory conduct and to make whole the victims of discrimi
nation. 124 The Supreme Court, however, has refused to displace
employment at will to the extent necessary to effectuate those
objectives.

119

" [E]mployers may hire and fire, promote and refuse
to promote for any reason, good
or bad, provided only that individuals may not be discriminated against because of race,
religion, sex, or national origin." 1 1 0 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey
during debate over Title VII).
120 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1233
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 1 1 5 S. Ct. 1397 ( 1995); see also Kenneth G. Parker, Note, After
Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 403, 430 (asserting Congress intended for Title VII to alter employment at will only
"slightly").
121

Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 70-71 ("[Title VII] creates caution where none was
necessary before.").
122
EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 148 (emphasis added).
123 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1233 n.20 ("[T]he employmen
t-at-will doctrine has been abridged
only to the extent necessary to enforce the federal employment discrimination laws.").
124
See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (identifying purposes
of discrimination
laws).
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Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S SUBORDINATION OF FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

If the statutes are intended to protect employees, is it
proper judicial performance to render, over and over,
single-minded interpretations that favor employers and
that predictably produce congressional reversal?125
The Court's campaign to bury the employment discrimination
laws and policies beneath the slab of employers' prerogatives can
be divided into two stages: before and after the Civil Rights Act of

1991. Furthermore, I consider three cases

Furnco Construction

-

Corp. v. Waters ,126 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,121 and
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 128 to be the most
important in this process. 129 In Furnco, the Court made it practi
cally impossible for plaintiffs to win employment discrimination
cases at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis-the
employer's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. 130
In Hicks, the Court substantially weakened plaintiffs' chances of
winning cases at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas

126 William P. Murphy, Meandering Musings About Discrimination Law, 10 LAB. LAW.
649, 654 (1994).
128 438 U.S. 567 ( 1978).
127 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
128 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
129 I realize that all three of the cases are disparate treatment cases. Although several
cases involving disparate impact have been very significant, these cases are more important
in the Court's ongoing subordination for three reasons. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
attempts to overturn most of the Court's holdings that weakened the disparate impact
theory, but Congress has yet to pass legislation to overturn these disparate treatment cases.
Second, disparate treatment is the type of discrimination most clearly targeted in federal
employment discrimination law, see supra note 103 (citing sources identifying primacy of
disparate treatment discrimination). Thus, the Court's assault on that theory more blatantly
flouts congressional intent. Third, some argue that the Court has treated disparate impact
as a subset of disparate treatment. Compare George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (1987) (arguing
disparate impact is extension of disparate treatment) with Allen et al., supra note 102, at
177 (contending disparate treatment cases are subset of disparate impact cases) and with
Steven L. Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34
AM. U. L. REV. 799, 804-08 (1985) (positing that disparate treatment and disparate impact
are based on different underlying theories).
13° Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
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analysis-the plaintiffs proof that the employer's articulated reason
is pretextual. 131 Finally, in McKennon, the Court targeted reme
dies and established that even if a p laintiff proves discrimination
in a disparate treatment case, he may recover very little if there is

after-acquired evidence of his wrongdoing.132
The practical effect of the Court's campaign is to make it difficult
for plaintiffs to prevail and obtain adequate remedies in employ
ment discrimination actions and, consequently, to discourage
plaintiffs from suing.

Thus, the subordination of employment

discrimination law and policies to the employment-at-will doctrine
takes place at two levels.

First, within the cases, management

prerogatives are being used to suppress the discrimination laws.
Second, once the whole of discrimination law is weakened by the
results in the individual cases, employment at will is left reigning
over the landscape of employment relations because fewer victims
of discrimination are willing to sue given their small chances of
prevailing. 133
A.

INCIPIENT SUBORDINATION

The Supreme Court's subordination of employment discrimina
tion law and its policies to the employment-at-will doctrine can be
traced to its Furnco opinion in 1978. 134 The Court began with the

131
132

133

Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.

See, e.g. , infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text (discussing how this dual
subordination operates in Hicks).
134
See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 71 (recognizing Furnco as Court's announcement
of "its general disinclination to 'restructure' private business practices"). Professors Blumoff
and Lewis point out that some earlier cases also evidence the Court's concern with balancing
the policies of federal discrimination law against market forces. Id. (citing Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 ( 1976) and Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977)). Not until Furnco, however, did the Court admonish courts not to second-guess
employers' business practices. Moreover, it is Furnco that is later quoted by courts in
decisions balancing employers' rights against discrimination victims' rights.
In a recent article, Professor D. Marvin Jones tracks the Court's "[s]ubmergence of
[d]isparate [t]reatment in [s]ubjectivism," and the collapse of the disparate impact (effects)
theory of discrimination. Jones, supra note 7, at 234 7-59. Professor Jones tracks those
themes through several of the same pre-McKennon cases that I identify as indicative of the
Court's subordination of employment discrimination law to employment at will. Professor
Jones, noting the relationship between the subjectivist view of intent and the common-law
rights of the employer, states, "A related premise here is that the employer's 'traditional
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disparate treatment theory and then moved to the disparate impact
theory. The subordination escalated until, in 1989, the Court
"dismembered" the disparate impact theory.135 With employment
discrimination law routed by the Court's onslaught, Congress inter
vened in 1991 by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. But the war
was not over.
1. Furnco: Insula ting the E mployer's Legi tima te, Nondiscrimina
tory Reason Agains t Judicial Second-Guessing. In Furnco, the
plaintiffs were black bricklayers who had applied at the jobsite for
1
employment. 36 The defendant's superintendent had not hired
two of the three plaintiffs,137 although they were fully qualified,
because the hiring practice was to hire only persons "whom he
knew to be experienced and competent" or persons who were
recommended to him.138 The plaintiffs brought an action alleging
racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. The trial court had
accepted as the employer's "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
that the company needed to hire people who had demonstrated

prerogatives' survive Title VII-that, in effect, the statute's parameters are framed by
common-law baselines." Id. at 2354. Indeed, the subjectivist view of intent is related to the
Court's elevation of employment at will: Rather than closely examining an employer's stated
reason for its actions, the Court defers to the common-law prerogatives of the employer and
admonishes that courts should not second-guess employers because courts are not competent
to perform such evaluations. E.g. , Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
Professor Deborah C. Malamud traces a different but related theme through the Supreme
Court's decisions from McDonnell Douglas through Hicks in The Last Minuet: Di8parate

Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995). She views the decisions as insulating
disparate treatment theory from the pro-plaintiff innovations in the Court's disparate impact
decisions. Id. at 2263-66. I disagree with Professor Malamud's characterization of the

McDonnell Douglas proof structure as "rest[ing] on an essentially conservative foundation."
Id. at 2266. Although she obviously is correct that many of the Court's decisions applying
the McDonnell Douglas analysis have reached results favoring defendants, I think the proof
structure developed in McDonnell Douglas was a pro-plaintiff innovation. Notwithstanding
our disagreement on McDonnell Douglas, I think there is some kinship in the themes she
and I trace in the post McDonnell Douglas decisions. Malamud notes that earlier cases in
the McDonnell Douglas line contain both "quotable passages explaining the need to eradicate
-

discrimination . . . . [and] passages . . . that articulate a need to protect management
prerogative against undue incursions." Id. at 2312-13 (footnote omitted). She, like I, also
recognizes that this same "problem" exists in the Supreme Court's decisions involving the
NLRA. Id. at 2313 n.268.
136 BlumotT & Lewis, supra note 6, at 33-45.
136 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 569.
137 The third plaintiff was hired so late in the project that he had the opportunity to work
only 20 days. Waters v. Fumco Constr. Co., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1977).
138 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 570.
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their competence to the superintendent and that evaluating
.
qualifications at the gate of the works1te would be too chao t•1c. 139
Rejecting that reason, the Seventh Circuit described a "middle
ground" approach between hiring at the gate and hiring only from
bricklayers known to the superintendent, 140 and ultimately held
for the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the court of appeals
had misconceived the second part of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis. 141 The Court explained that to satisfy the second part,
the employer need only offer " 'some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason. ' "142 The employer's practice need not be the best for
hiring the maximum number of minority employees. 143 The Court
explained that courts are not competent to restructure employers'
business practices, "and unless mandated to do so by Congress they
The underlying rationale for this
should not attempt it. "144
"refinement" of the second part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis

is quite clear: courts should not tread on employers' prerogatives
in order to achieve the goals of Title VII. 145

139
140

Waters, 551 F.2d at 1088.
Id. The court's recommendation

Interestingly, the

really was quite simple: take written applications

that would indicate the qualifications of the applicant and then compare the qualifications

Id. at 1088-89.
Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578.
142 Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792 802 ( 1978)).
14 3 Id. at 577-78. Professor Jones challenges the Court's proclamation with the question,
"Why not?" Jones, supra note 7, at 2350. Professor Jones then answers his question by
of the applicant with those of persons on the superintendent's list.
141

,

explaining that the Court assumes that the discrimination prohibited by Title VII is a
product of an employer's intent, and because Furnco exhibited no intent to exclude blacks
in this case, no prohibited discrimination occurred.

Id.

I do not disagree with that answer.

Tracking a different but related theme through the Court's decisions, however, I arrive at
a different but closely related answer.
144
145

Furnco, 436 U.S. at 578.
See Blumoff & Lewis, supra

note 6, at 71 (citing Furnco in support of proposition that

see also Culp,
supra note 107, at 967 (citing passage from Furnco regarding courts' incompetence to restruc
"common-law baselines have long informed" Court's Title VII jurisprudence);

ture business practices as evidence that some federal judges believe Title VII cannot
effectively eliminate discrimination because such law is unable to control market forces).
An alternative explanation may be that, regardless ofwhether the law can control market
forces, judges, operating from a baseline of employment at will, do not believe that the law

should

control market forces and employers' prerogatives.

See

Massey,

supra

note 46, at

557-60 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on old property (based on traditional
criteria of ownership) and new property (based on government entitlements) in context of
employment at will). Then-Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in Furnco.
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Furnco admonition regardingjudicial incompetence to second-guess
employers p arallels one of the theories explaining the widespread
adoption of employment at will by state courts. Courts adopted the
doctrine because they did not deem themselves competent to
evaluate employers' discharge decisions.146
The Court could have interpreted "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" as allowing an examination of the objective reasonableness
of the reason articulated by the employer.

Indeed, one would

expect such an interpretation if the Court were more interested in
effectuating the objectives of employment discrimination law than
protecting employers' common-law prerogatives. 147 Instead, the
Court in Furnco balanced employers' prerogatives and federal em
ployment discrimination law and struck a balance in favor of
employers' prerogatives.

This theme was to be repeated in

subsequent decisions, becoming more slanted each time Furnco was
invoked.
The Court in Furnco also observed that, although it was decreas
ing a plaintiffs chance of victory at the second stage of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff still could prevail at
stage three by proving that the employer's legitimate, nondiscrimi
natory reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination.148 Fifteen
years later, the Court would extrapolate the employer-prerogative
theme of Furnco to render an interpretation of the pretext stage
that virtually forecloses plaintiffs from winning cases at that stage
of the analysis.

This further frontal assault on the disparate

treatment analysis would not come to fruition until 1993 in St.

146

Morriss, supra note 35, at 762-63.

147 See Jones, supra note 7, at 2349-50 (explaining that inquiry into reasonableness
comports with role of McDonnell Douglas prima facie case-eliminating most-common
nondiscriminatory explanations for acts-and with proper balance between policies of Title
VII and legitimate business concerns). Professor Murphy reaches the following conclusion

regarding the Court's construction of Title VII:
At one time, it was an accepted canon of statutory construction (canonized by
the Supreme Court) that remedial social legislation should be hospitably and
generously construed to effectuate its purpose. Beginning in about 1976, this
canon of construction was largely abandoned by the Supreme Court in
discrimination law, and in subsequent years, culminating in 1989, the Court
produced a series of decisions in which it rejected the view of law that favored
employees and adopted a view that favored employers.
Murphy, supra note 125, at 653.
148

Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578.
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In the meantime, the Court

availed itself of several opportunities to subordinate discrimination
victims' rights to employers' rights, most notably decimating the
disparate impact theory and weakening the disparate treatment
theory in mixed-motives cases.

2. Extrapolating from Furnco: The Mantra of Judicial Incompe
tence and Employers' Prerogatives. In 1988, a plurality of the Court
incorporated the theme of supremacy of employers' prerogatives
from Furnco into its decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust150 to weaken the disparate impact theory and lay the

foundation for a more devastating attack in Wards Cove.

In

Watson, the plaintiff, a black woman who several times had been
passed over for a promotion, brought an action under Title VII
alleging race discrimination under disparate impact theory. The
Court first held that disparate impact analysis is applicable not
only to objective employment criteria, but also to subjective
criteria. 151 However, a plurality of the Court then went on to sig
nificantly reduce a plaintiffs chances of recovering under the
disparate impact theory. First, the plurality announced that, as
part of the prima facie case, a plaintiff must isolate the specific
employment practice challenged and then establish a causal
relationship between that practice and the exclusion of members of
the protected group. 152

Next, it articulated a "watered-down"

version of the employer's business-necessity defense, requiring only
that the challenged practice be sufficiently related to a legitimate
business purpose. 153 Finally, the plurality placed the burden of
persuasion of that defense on the plaintiff. 154
The plurality also suggested a change adverse to plaintiffs in the
third stage of a disparate impact case, at which a plaintiff attempts
to demonstrate that an alternative test or device would achieve the
employer's objectives without the discriminatory effects.

The

plurality stated that cost and other burdens imposed by the

149 1 13 S. Ct. 2742 ( 1993); see infra notes 1 88-237 and
accompanying text (discussing
Hicks).
150 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
161
Id. at 991.
152
Id. at 994 (plurality opinion).
16.'I Id. at 999.
1� Id. at 998.
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proposed alternative are relevant in determining whether the
alternative is "equally as effective as the challenged practice" in
achieving the employer's legitimate goals.155
Having altered the disparate impact case in these ways, the
plurality conjured up Furnco and further diluted the business
necessity defense by admonishing that, in determining whether
subjective employment criteria are sufficiently related to legitimate
business purposes, courts must bear in mind that they " 'are
generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should
not attempt it.' "156 The plurality acknowledged that plaintiffs
would find it difficult to prevail under these "high standards of
proof in disparate impact cases"157 and explained that such
standards w�re necessary to prevent giving incentives to employers
to "introduc[e] quotas or preferential treatment" as a method of
avoiding liability.158 Thus, the plurality was careful to show that
it would not interpret employment discrimination law in a manner
favoring plaintiffs without imposing significant limitations on them,
a position that in fact made the decision more of a defeat for
plaintiffs. This theme was to be played out again in McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 159

The following year, the Court fired salvos at both the disparate
treatment theory and the disparate impact theory, rendering the
latter virtually a dead letter. First, the Court attacked disparate
treatment in Price Water house v. Hopk ins,160 in which yet another
plurality of the Court honed its Furnco language and clearly stated
its subordination of Title VII to employers' prerogatives. In Price
Waterhouse , the Court encountered a Title VII plaintiff to whom
the defendant accounting firm had denied a partnership promotion

155 Id.

156 Id. at 999 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)).
15 7 Id.
158 Id. Professor Culp describes the plurality's discussion as "turn[ing] Title VII on its

head to protect white employers' ability to perpetuate procedures that freeze black workers
out of the job market, while forestalling any success by the processes created by Title VII to
encourage employers to take account of the number of black workers hired." Culp, supra
note 107, at 1003.
159 115 S. C t . 879 ( 1995); see infra notes 273-396 and accompanying text (discussing
McKennon).
160
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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based on both an illegal reason-her sex-and a legal reason-her
lack of interpersonal skills.161 A plurality of the Court developed
a framework for analyzing such "mixed-motives" disparate treat
ment cases, that is, those in which the employer's adverse decision
was motivated by both an illegitimate, discriminatory reason and
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.162
The plurality an
nounced at the outset the policies that would drive its decision:
"Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among
employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice.
This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives
turns out to be decisive in the case before us. "163 The plurality
concluded that when an employer considers both gender and
legitimate factors in making a decision, it makes the decision
"because of' sex within the meaning of Title VII's prohibition. 164
The plurality then went on to hold that an employer, even if it had
acted contrary to Title VII, could avoid imposition of liability by
proving that it would have taken the same action in the absence of
the discriminatory motive. 165 In announcing this "affirmative
defense" to Title VII liability, the plurality reiterated its emphasis
on employers' prerogatives:
To say that an employer may not take gender into
account is not, however, the end of the matter. . . . The
other important aspect of the statute is its preservation
of an employer's remaining freedom of choice.
We
conclude that the preservation of this freedom means
that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that,
even if it had not taken gender into account, it would
have come to the same decision regarding a particular
person. The statute's maintenance of employer prerog
atives is evident from the statute itself and from its
history, both in Congress and in this Court. 166

1 1
6 Id. at 234-35.

162

1

Id. at 240.

63 Id. at 239 (emphasis added).

164 Id. at 241.

165 Id. at 242, 258.
166

Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
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In his dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality's internal
inconsistency in determining that an employer has made a decision
"because of' sex and yet permitting the employer to avoid liability
notwithstanding its violation of the statute.167 He pointed out
that neither the language of Title VII nor its legislative history sup
ported an affirmative defense based on employers' prerogatives. 168
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,169 also decided in 1989, is
notable for the majority's adoption of the Watson plurality's
disparate impact analysis. The Court clarified the Watson version
of the employer's business "necessity" test as "whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate goals of the
employer."170
The Court also placed its imprimatur on the
Watson plurality's adjustments of the plaintiffs demonstration of
less discriminatory alternatives, holding that they must be as
"equally effective" as the employer's chosen practice, and that cost
and other burdens imposed by the alternatives are relevant in
determining their effectiveness. 171 Of course, the Court again
quoted from Furnco the mantra regarding courts' inferior compe
tence in restructuring business practices.172
Congress Strikes Back: The Civil Rights Act of 1991 . Price
Waterhouse and Wards Cove were not the only decisions rendered
3.

by the Court in 1989 that were adverse to plaintiffs under federal
employment discrimination law and its underlying policies.173

167 Id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 286; see also Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New
Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495, 520 ( 1990) (asserting
plurality stumbled by inventing "management prerogative exception" to Title VII liability in

mixed-motives cases).
169 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
110 Id. at 659.
171 Id. at 661.
172

Id. The Wards Cove Court did demonstrate some originality, placing the seemingly
required Furnco passage in the context of its discussion of the alternative practices. Id. The
Watson Court, on the other hand, had invoked the words when warning courts about
evaluating the sufficiency of the relationship between the employer's chosen practice and its
legitimate goals. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 ( 1988}.
173 See, e.g. , Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 ( 1989) (limiting
reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in employment discrimination actions by holding that § 1981 does
not apply to conduct occurring after formation of contract); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
761 (1989) (holding white plaintiffs harmed by affirmative action plan in consent decree
arising from separate action were not precluded from challenging plan); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900, 911 ( 1989) (holding statute of limitations applicable to dis-
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Indeed, employers won thirteen of fourteen employment law cases
decided during the 1988-89 term. 174 Congress set about to stem
the tide of the assault on discrimination law, passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, 175 but President Bush, labelling the legislation
a "quota bill," vetoed it. 176 During its next session, Congress
reintroduced and passed the proposed legislation, and President
Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991.177 The Act had
as one of its purposes overturning several of the Court's decisions,
1
particularly from the 1988-89 term. 78
Shortly after passage of the 199 1 Act, Professor Culp, predicting
Congress would soon need to reform the law again, noted, "Un
doubtedly, these will be the Civil Rights Acts of 1998, 2005, and
2010."179 He further predicted that, like the Civil Rights Act of
199 1, none of these chimerical laws would permanently resolve race
problems in our society. 180 He premised this prediction on his
belief that courts are unwilling to raise and address the "race
question," which he formulates as, "How does race alter the

crimination actions based on challenge to facially neutral seniority plan begins to

run

on

plan's adoption date rather than date plan harms plaintiff); Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 ( 1989) (denying plaintiff class award of attorney's fees
against union intervening in class action to challenge settlement agreement, where
intervention not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation).
174

Murphy, supra note 125, at 654. Professor Murphy assesses the Court's treatment of

the federal employment discrimination laws in definitive terms: "Not since the New Deal
days has the Supreme Court given laws passed by Congress such hostile treatment." Id.
175

Congress Approves Civil Rights Bill but Falls Short of Veto-Proof Majority, DAILY LAB.

REP., Oct. 18, 1990, at A-4.
178
177

136 CONG. REC. Sl6,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 ( 1 991) (codified as
amended principally in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)). Professor Culp notes
that the 1991 Act, like its predecessor, appeared destined to be vetoed. Culp, supra note 107,
at 965. Culp muses about the effect that the confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas may
have had on the President's decision to sign the bill. Id.
178 H
.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-96. Commentators have criticized the Act for various reasons. See,
e.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 2364 n.198 (criticizing Act's failure to overturn requirement in

Wards Cove that plaintiffs identify specific practice causing discriminatory harm); Turner,
supra note 7, at 456 & n.373 (noting commentators have criticized Act for returning law to
inconsistent pre Wards Cove case law without offering clarification).
See generally
Symposium, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Unraveling the Controversy, 45 RU'l'GERS L. REV.
-

889 ( 1993) (discussing various aspects of Act).
179

1so

Culp, supra note 107, at 967.
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Professor Culp was proven to be

prophetic even sooner than he expected, as the Court decided Hicks
in time for him to add a postscript to his article.182
I agree with Culp: If federal employment discrimination law is
to retain (or regain) a role as a body of law embodying and serving
public policy rather than being reduced to just another basis for
tort recovery, C ongress will have to step in again and again. Will
Congress ever be able to effect the "permanent" change that Culp
deems impossible? I posit that such reform will not be possible
until the Supreme Court stops subordinating federal employment
discrimination law and its policies to the employment-at-will
doctrine.

In Hicks and McKennon, the Court announced in a

stentorian voice that it is not about to do so.
ESCALATING SUBORDINATION

B.

Not to be subdued by Congress,183 the Court took the offensive
again in 1993, targeting the disparate treatment theory, with its
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.184 Hicks reached a
new level in the subordination of employment discrimination law,
but it was soon to be surpassed by the Court's decision in McKen
non v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. 185 Hicks and McKennon
each illustrate the Supreme C ourt's subordination of employment
discrimination law to employment at will. That message becomes
all the more apparent, however, when the two cases, which share
some characteristics, are compared.186

181
1

82

183

Id. at 966-67.
Id. at 1007-10.
Commenting on the Hicks decision following enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

Professor Culp stated:
One might have thought that the conservative majority on this Court might
have been chastened by Congress' actions in specifically rejecting several
Supreme Court opinions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, but it is clear . . . that
this Court will continue to force Congress to rewrite the Court's interpreta
tion of Title VII law.

Id. at 1010; see also Brookins, supra note 69, at 943 (observing Congress's enactment of 1991
Act left Court "undaunted[,] . . . because the Court is inherently more agile than Congress").
184
185

113 S. Ct. 2742 ( 1993).
115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).

186

Two commentators, writing between the Court's decisions in Hicks and McKennon,

suggested the importance of comparing the cases:
[I]t will be interesting to see what approach the Court adopts [in McKennon],
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Hicks: Eviscerating Plaintiffs' Opportunity to Pre vail at the
Pretext Stage.
1.

You know I hate, detest, and can't bear a lie, not because
I am straighter than the rest of us, but simply because it
appal{l,]s me. There is a taint of death, a flavour of
mortality in lies-which is exactly what I hate aT}-d detest
in the world-what I want to forget.
It makes me
miserable and sick, like biting something rotten would
1s1
do.
a. The Decision an d Analysis. In Hicks, the plaintiff was a
correctional officer fired by the defendant halfway house after
engaging in a heated exchange with his newly appointed supervi
sor, in which he allegedly threatened the supervisor. 188 Hicks
had an unremarkable employment record prior to the new supervis
or's appointment, but thereafter he was disciplined several
times-a suspension for five days b ased on his subordinates' rules
violations; a letter of reprimand for failure to adequately investi
gate a brawl between inmates; and a demotion from shift com
mander to correctional officer for failing to have his subordinates
log in use of an employer-owned vehicle 189-before ultimately
being discharged. 1 90 After his discharge, Hicks brought an action
alleging discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII and
section 1983.191

particularly in light of its decision in Hicks where the employer had created
a pretext for the termination and the Court held that the employer's lying did
not result in a verdict for the employee as a matter of law.
Robert B. Fitzpatrick & Marlissa S. Briggett, Review of Significant U.S.

Appellate Decisions, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE

OF STUDY:

Supre11U1 Court and

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN

EMPLOYMENT LAW (1994).
187
JOSEPH C ONRAD , HEART OF DARKNESS 27 (Robert Kimbrough ed., 1963).

188 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993).
189 Although the Supreme Court did not include these facts in its recitation, the trial court

found that several white shift commanders had committed arguably more egregious
violations than Hicks for which they had not been disciplined as harshly. Hicks v. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (E.D. Mo. 1991). Moreover, the trial court noted that
Hicks's outburst occurred immediately after he was advised of his demotion and only after
the supervisor had provoked him. Id. at 1251. Indeed, the court found that the supervisor
"manufactured
plaintiff." Id.

the

confrontation between plaintiff and himself in order to terminate

190 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
19 1

42 u.s.c. § 1983 ( 1988).
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The employer offered as the legitimate reasons for discharging
Hicks his repeated and increasingly severe violations of the
employer's rules.192 The district court concluded that the plaintiff
had satisfied the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis by
proving his employer's articulated reasons were pretextual. 193
The plaintiffs proof of pretext consisted of evidence that, although
his coworkers had committed rules violations at least as severe,
they were disciplined less harshly.194 Nonetheless, the district
court held that the plaintiff did not satisfy the ultimate burden of
proving intentional discrimination. The court concluded that,
although the reasons given by the employer were false, the plaintiff
"ha[d] not proven that the crusade [to terminate him] was racially
rather than personally motivated. "195
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff
who proves pretext at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.196 In a five
to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a finding
of pretext does not mandate judgment for a plaintiff as a matter of
law. 191
The opinions of the majority and the dissent are remarkably
contentious. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, suggests in no
uncertain terms that the dissent misunderstands the Court's
precedent on this issue198 and finds absurd the dissent's charac
terization as a "liar" an employer whose articulated reason is not
believed.199 Justice Souter, writing the dissenting opinion, does
indeed accuse the majority of abandoning the well-established
McDonnell Douglas framework and its primary purpose200 and of
adopting instead an analysis that favors lying employers over
victims of discrimination.20 1
1 92
193

194

196

Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251.
Id. at 1248, 1251.
Id. at 1252.

196 Hicks
2742 (1993).
197
198

v.

St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.

Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
Id. at 2750 ("Only one unfamiliar with our case-law will be upset by the dissent's

alarum that we are today setting aside 'settled precedent[]' [and] . . . 'two decades of stable
law in this Court[.]' ").
199 Id. at 2754.
200
201

Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2763, 2766.
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Hicks is an important case in employment discrimination law
because of its focus on defining a plaintiffs burden at the third
stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
Because plaintiffs
usually can make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and
because defendants usually can produce evidence of legitimate
reasons for their actions, most disparate treatment cases analyzed
under McDonnell Douglas are won or lost at the third stage of the
analysis. 202 Dealing as it does with the most significant stage of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the Court in Hicks declares very
bad law for plaintiffs under federal employment discrimination
law. 203 As bad as the holding of the case is for plaintiffs, the

ambiguities of the decision have created even worse law in some
lower court interpretations of Hicks.
Prior to Hicks, the fleshing out of the third stage of the McDon
nell Douglas analysis had taken shape in the lower courts as a
battle between "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus. "204 The questions
on which the courts focused were whether the third stage required
a plaintiff to prove only that an employer's articulated reasons were
pretextual or rather that the reasons were pretexts for discrimina
tion (that is, both that the articulated reasons were false and that
the true reason was discriminatory) and what types of evidence had

202

Catherine Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff L<Jses:

The Fallacy of the

"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsTINGS L.J. 57, 67 (1991).
203 Although the plaintiff in Hicks brought his claim under only Title VII, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) interprets Hicks as applying equally to
disparate treatment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. EEOC:
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON ST. MARy's HONOR CENTER v. HICKS, reprinted in DAILY LAB.
REP., Apr. 13, 1994, at F-3 n.2.
204 See, e.g. , Brookins, supra note 69, at 946 (detailing battle between circuits over use of
pretext-only and pretext-plus); Lanctot, supra note 202, at 71 (citing inconsistency among
federal circuits resulting from battle over pretext-only and pretext-plus); see also Anderson
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1 122-23 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing pretext-plus,
pretext-only, and a version of pretext-only, and stating Court in Hicks adopted compromise
approach of variation of pretext-only).
Professor Malamud suggests a formulation that is perhaps more helpful than pretext
only/pretext-plus because it describes the effects of the "combined evidence" of the plaintiff
(from the first and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis). Malamud, supra note
134, at 2306-07. Three positions are possible: "judgment for plaintiff always permitted";
"judgment for plaintiff sometimes permitted"; and "judgment for defendant required." Id.
at 2306.
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to be proffered to satisfy the burden.205 In Hicks, the Supreme
Court chose the latter interpretation, holding that a plaintiff
satisfies his burden at stage three by proving both that the
employer's articulated reasons are pretextual and that the true
reason is a prohibited discriminatory one. However, the Court in
Hicks left unclear what evidence a plaintiff must proffer to prove
that the true reason is discriminatory.
Some commentators have interpreted the majority's opinion as
adopting a "pure" pretext-plus approach, requiring a plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case, prove the employer's articulated
reasons to be pretextual, and present additional direct evidence of
discrimination.206 Indeed, the Hicks dissent reads the majority's
approach as being susceptible of a pretext-plus interpretation.207
Notwithstanding the arguably contradictory language in the
08
majority's opinion,2 the better interpretation of the decision is
that the C ourt adopted a middle ground between pretext-only and

205 See, e.g. , Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1 1 22-23 (detailing different approaches to pretext);
Brookins, supra note 69, at 946 (same); Lanctot, supra note 202, at 65-66 (same); see also
Julian R. Birnbaum, Some Recent Decisions and Current Issues in EEO Cases, in CONTEMPO
RARY ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

47TH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 445, 447-48 (Bruno Stein ed. , 1995)
[hereinafter CONTEMPORARY ISSUES) (describing pretext-only approach as treating evidence
of pretext as "bipolar," meaning that it serves two purposes).
206 E.
g. , The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 348.
207 Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("This 'pretext-plus' approach would
tum Burdine on its head . . . . "}.
208 Early in the opinion the Court states:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination
[and] . . . "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required."

Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. The foregoing passage suggests that the Court did not adopt a
pure pretext-plus approach. Three pages later, however, the Court states the following:
"Surely a more reasonable reading [of Burdine] is that proving the employer's reason false
becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the
real reason was intentional discrimination." Id. at 2752. This passage suggests that the
Court did adopt a pure pretext-plus approach. See Jody H. Odell, Case Comment, Between
Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and its
Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1268-71 (1994) (discussing
language in majority opinion supporting different interpretations}.
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pretext-plus (labelled by one commentator as "pretext-maybe"209),
holding that if a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and proves
that the employer's articulated reason is false, the trier of fact may,
although it is not required to as a matter of law, infer that the true
reason was discriminatory. 210 Although this approach still requires
some "plus" evidence (that is, in addition to the proof of falsity),
that requirement apparently can be satisfied by the prima facie and
pretext evidence if such evidence provides a connection between the
falsity and the alleged discrimination.211
However, even if Hicks is interpreted as taking the middle
ground approach, that interpretation provides little comfort for
plaintiffs. In fact, the only positive aspect for plaintiffs is that the
Court did not adopt the more disadvantageous pure pretext-plus
approach. The middle-ground approach takes the sword out of the
plaintiff's hand: once the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory
reason, the trier of fact is not required, based upon proof of pretext,
to conclude that discrimination occurred,212 and thus, the plaintiff

2
09 Michael J. Lambert, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks;

Approach, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 163 ( 1994).

The •Pretext-Maybe"

210

EEOC: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON ST. MARl"S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS, supra note
203, at F-2; see also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1 120, 1 123 (7th Cir. 1994)

(explaining Court rejected pretext-plus approach in favor of version of pretext-only earlier
adopted by Seventh Circuit); Brookins, supra note 69, at 964-65 (noting ambiguous language
in Hicks and concluding Court adopted approach between pretext-plus and pretext-only);
Odell, supra note 208, at 1269-76, 1282 (discussing support for "permissive inference"
interpretation of Hicks); cf Marcantel v. State Dep't ofTransp. & Dev., 3 7 F.3d 197, 200 (5th
Cir. 1994) (asserting Court decided pretext alone is insufficient to satisfy burden at third
stage of McDonnell Douglas analysis).
211
See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 ("The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina
tion."); see also Brookins, supra note 69, at 964-65 (detailing extent of"plus" evidence needed
to satisfy Hicks standard). But see Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir.
1994) (labelling foregoing language in Hicks as "obvious[] dicta"), reh'g en bane granted, 49
F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 1995).
212
See Calloway, supra note 85, at 1001 (asserting trier of fact is no longer required to
find discrimination even if plaintiff proves pretext and presents additional evidence); cf
Jones, supra note 7, at 2358 (arguing pretext evidence is interpreted as proving only that
employer either lied or erred, and comparative evidence is "quintessentially equivocal"); The
Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 349 (positing that without direct evidence
and without presumption of discrimination based on proof of pretext, plaintiffs chances of
winning depend on whether factfinder believes discrimination is prevalent in employment
decisions).
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has only a scintilla of a chance of winning at the third stage
without a trial. 213 Even worse for plaintiffs, the ambiguities in
Hicks have spawned even more deleterious progeny in the lower
courts.
Struggling with Hicks's evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs
attempting to satisfy their burden at the third stage,214 some
lower courts not only have taken the sword from plaintiffs, but also
have allowed defendant employers to brandish the swords of
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law more
freely.215
Indeed, Justice Souter predicted this result in his
dissent in Hicks because he was aware that the majority's opinion
was susceptible of interpretation as adoption of a pure pretext-plus
approach. 216 Thus, the notion of pretext-plus has crept back into
some post-Hicks cases discussing the standard for summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law, with some courts
requiring evidence in addition to that used to establish the prima
facie case and to demonstrate pretext.217

213

Brookins, supra note 69, at 957.

214 This issue may be framed as determining the type and quantity of "plus evidence"

required. Id. at 959.
216 See generally Mark S. Dichter & Debra L. Casey, Summary Judgment in Employment
Cases, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 1 (P.L.l. Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 522, 1995) (surveying post-Hicks summary judgment decisions);
Zeldin, supra note 19, at 933-34. Both motions for summary judgment and judgment as a
matter oflaw test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. See Lambert, supra note 209, at
200-04 (giving examples of court decisions addressing plaintiffs' burden after Hicks); cf.
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 2713.1, at 613 ( 1969) ("The directed
verdict motion rests on the same theory as a Rule 56 motion . . . . ").
216 Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("This 'pretext-plus' approach . . .
would result in summary judgment for the employer in the many cases where the plaintiff
has no evidence beyond that required to prove a prima facie case and to show that the
employer's articulated reasons are unworthy of credence.").
217 This is what Professor Malamud labels the "judgment for defendant required" position.
Malamud, supra note 134, at 2306. See e.g. , Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 542
,

(5th Cir. 1994) (concluding Court in Hicks rejected pretext-only and holding that plaintiff
cannot avoid judgment as matter of law by establishing prima facie case and creating
genuine issue of fact on pretext), reh'g en bane granted, 49 F.3d 127 (5th Cir. 1995), reh'g en
bane, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1720 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit, in the
rehearing en bane, decided that Hicks does not provide a categorical answer to when
evidence establishing a prima facie case and pretext is sufficient to withstand a motion
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Rhodes, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1722.
Rather, the court stated, such evidence may be sufficient in some cases and insufficient in
others. Id. at 1722-23. Evaluating the case before it, the Fifth Circuit, overturning the
panel's decision, held that the district court properly denied the defendant's motion for
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
taken the position that the Court rejected the pretext-plus approach
in Hicks and that establishment of a prima facie case and evidence
of pretext is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judg
218
ment.
Even courts that accept the foregoing interpretation of
Hicks disagree whether sufficient evidence of pretext must be
adduced in addition to that presented to make out the prima facie
case, or whether the prima facie evidence can serve double duty
and alone raise a genuine issue of material fact on pretext.

219

JNOV. Id. at 1725.
A federal district court applying the Fifth Circuit panel's interpretation of Hicks to
consideration of a defendant's motion for summary judgment described the third stage of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis as two-pronged. Deaver v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 886
F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Tex. 1995).

The court concluded that although the plaintiff had

established a genuine issue of material fact on the falsity of the defendant's reasons, she had
not established a genuine issue regarding the "second prong of the third step"-proof that
the discriminatory reasons were the real reasons. Id.

The court acknowledged that the

plaintiffs interpretation of Hicks was a "logical reading" of the case, but it explained that the

Fifth Circuit in Rhodes declared the language on which plaintiff relied to be dicta. Id. at 583
n.4. The district court further opined that "[t)he Fifth Circuit's interpretation [of Hicks] .

.

.

makes it difficult for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment without compelling evidence
evoking the defendant's discriminatory intent. This creates a truly formidable burden upon
a plaintiff." Id. This burden should be ameliorated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in the
rehearing en bane of Rhodes.
218

EEOC: ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON ST. MARYS HONOR CENTER V. HICKS, supra note
203, at F 3 ; see also EEOC v. IPMC, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 163, 164 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In its
-

original decision in IPMC, the court construed Hicks as requiring a plaintiff in a Title VII
or ADEA claim to establish both that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
a defendant's articulated reason for its adverse e mployment action is false and whether the
true reason is discriminatory. EEOC v. IPMC, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 200, 205-06 (E.D. Mich.

1993). In vacating its earlier decision, the court stated it had been convinced by the EEOC

that it had read Hicks too broadly. The court then explained its new understanding of Hicks:
Hicks, in the context of an age discrimination claim, stands for the propo
sition that once a defendant articulates its justification for an employment ac

tion, the trier of fact then must proceed to the ultimate question of whether
plaintiff has proven that the defendant has intentionally discriminated

against him because of his age.
IPMC, 156 F.R.D. at 164. But see Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-91 (9th Cir.

1994) (rejecting proposition that prima facie case is sufficient to survive motion for summary
judgment).
219

Compare Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890-91 ("[W)hen evidence to refute the defendant's
legitimate explanation is totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though
plaintiff may have established a minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas
type presumption." (emphasis in original)) with Bragalone v. Kona Coast Resort Joint
Venture, 866 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (D. Haw. 1994) (following Wallis but holding same direct
evidence used to establish prima facie case may be considered in determining whether
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Thus, divergent interpretations of Hicks and uncertainties regard
ing the type of evidence necessary have placed plaintiffs asserting
disparate treatment claims in jeopardy of having their cases struck
down before trial or without resolution by the factfinder.220
Viewed in isolation, Hicks looks bad enough for plaintiffs
proceeding under the employment discrimination statutes. Viewed
in light of the progression of cases which over the last two decades
have eroded plaintiffs' rights under those laws, it looks worse.
Hicks substantially surpasses Furnco in terms of making it difficult

for

plaintiffs

to

recover

in

disparate

treatment

cases.

In

Furnco,221 the Court eliminated the second stage of the McDon
nell Douglas analysis as a point at which plaintiffs are likely to win

treatment cases. Although the Furnco Court, by emphasizing that
a plaintiff could still win by proving pretext,222 sought to temper
the negative effect that its decision had on a plaintiffs chance of
prevailing under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, fifteen years
later in Hicks the Court further stripped the McDonnell Douglas
framework of its viability as a means for plaintiffs to prove
3
intentional discrimination.22
To say that Hicks was "wrongly" decided is perhaps an overstate
ment if the decision is evaluated on the majority's terms. As the
majority noted, lower courts had differed on resolution of the
pretext-only versus pretext-plus issue.224 Although a majority of
lower courts apparently followed the pretext-only approach,225

plaintiff has raised triable issue of fact on pretext).
220 See Brookins, supra note 69, at 957 ("Under the Hicks standard, a plaintiff who would
have easily reached a fact-finder during the last twenty years will possibly become easy prey
for an employer's motion for either summary judgment or directed verdict, even if the
employer has virtually no defense for the adverse action." (footnote omitted)). A plaintiffs
predicament is probably no greater in courts that followed the pretext-plus approach before
Hicks. It will likely be greater, however, in courts that followed the pretext-only approach

before Hicks.
221

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); see also supra notes 136-149

and accompanying text (discussing Furnco).
222 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578.
223 Brookins, supra note 69, at 978-79 (explaining employers may escape summary
judgment or directed verdicts on "the flimsiest of grounds"-facially legitimate reasons that
need not be true).
224

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 1 13 S. Ct. 2742, 2750 (1993); see also Lanctot, supra

note 202, at 71-91 (discussing adoption of each approach among courts).
226

Brookins, supra note 69, at 946; Lanctot, supra note 202, at 71-8 1 ; The Supreme

Court-Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 342.

350

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:305

that fact hardly seems a basis on which to conclude the Supreme
Court reached the wrong resolution of the issue. 226 In short, the
Court in Hicks did no great violence to either prior case law221 or
to Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (regarding the effect
of presumptions), the latter which figured prominently in the
majority's opinion.228 However, the result in Hicks can be evalu
ated in terms of the policies it promotes and the policies it subordi
nates and, under those terms, the Court did not decide the case
9
correctly. 22
The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is to assist
plaintiffs in presenting circumstantial evidence of discrimina
Subjective intent is a difficult thing to prove, 231 and
tion. 230
without some objective employer manifestations acting as a proxy,

226 For example, a majority of the federal courts of appeals adopted the Summers
approach to after-acquired evidence, but the Supreme Court in McKennon rejected
(somewhat) that approach as wrong. See infra notes 273-326 and accompanying text
(discussing McKennon and pre-McKennon approaches to after-acquired evidence).
227
The majority and dissent, of course, do interpret language in prior cases differently,
but the split in the circuits indicates that this was not a new debate.
228
Calloway, supra note 85, at 1002. But see Malamud, supra note 134, at 2262 & n . 1 10

(explaining that Rule 301 did not require result reached in Hicks).
She argues that the Court correctly decided Hicks.
229 Professor Malamud disagrees.
Malamud, supra note 134, at 2237. She contends that the "nostalgic" critique of the
McDonnell Douglas line of cases is flawed. Id. at 2232-37. That critique, she argues, fails
to identify "an essentially conservative foundation" in the cases. Id. at 2266. Malamud sees
in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, efforts by the Court to insulate the disparate
treatment cases from the pro-plaintiff innovations in disparate impact cases. Id. at 2263-66.
Accordingly, she does not find in the McDonnell Douglas line of cases a pro-plaintiff policy
"needed to justify a mandatory pro-plaintiff presumption that is insufficiently supported by

the weight of the evidence." Id.
230 Brookins, supra note 69, at 980-81; cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271
( 1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard

to come by.").
231 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7 1 1, 716 ( 1983)
(recognizing difficulty of determining employer's motivation, but emphasizing necessity of
inquiry under Title Vil). The Court pulled a quote from antiquity to assure courts that the
task is not impossible:
"The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.
It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at
a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as
anything else."
Id. at 716-17 (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885) (Bowen, L.J.));
see also Jones, supra note 7, at 2351 (asserting subjective explanations escape scrutiny).
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it is virtually impossible to prove.232 Moreover, an employer is in
a better position than a plaintiff-employee to know and explain why
the employer acted as it did.233

Thus, the McDonnell Douglas

analysis was developed to provide that proxy.234

Courts were

willing to make "the basic assumption" that, absent a credible
explanation of a legitimate reason, adverse treatment of members
of protected groups was more likely than not caused by intentional
discrimination. 235

The decision to make that assumption was

based on policy-the policy of federal employment discrimination
law.236 In Hicks, a majority of the Court was no longer willing to
make that assumption.

In effect, the Court said the fact that an

employer gives a pretextual reason for its actions does not necessar
ily mean that it took those actions because of discriminatory
intent.237
b. The Triumph ofEmployment at Will, Again. Why would the

Court adopt an interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis
that is contrary to the policies of federal employment discrimination
law? Why is a majority of the Court no longer willing to make the
"basic assumption"?

The Court itself obliquely provides that

232 Consider, for example, the concept of intent in the context of intentional torts. It is
hornbook law that the prima facie element of intent may be established either by showing
that the tortfeasor had the purpose of causing the result or that the tortfeasor knew to a
substantial certainty that her act would cause the result. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

8, at 33-34 (5th ed. 1984).

Because the subjective

purpose is difficult to prove absent an admission, the more objective alternative of
"knowledge to a substantial certainty" serves as a proxy.
233 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
234 In evaluating Hicks, I am reminded of a pre-Hicks conversation I had with a colleague
who teaches and writes in the area of corporate law.

He had been reading about the

McDonnell Douglas analysis and wanted to discuss it with me.

When we discussed the

pretext stage, I explained that the plaintitrs burden could be interpreted as either proving
pretext or proving pretext for discrimination. He responded that "pretext for discrimination"
could not be the proper interpretation because then the McDonnell Douglas analysis would
mean nothing; it would not provide a proxy for intentional discrimination. My colleague was
quite surprised when the Hicks decision was rendered.
235 Calloway, supra note 85, at 997-98 (tracing this "basic assumption" to Court's
explanation of why establishing prima facie case raises rebuttable presumption ofintentional
discrimination). See generally Birnbaum, supra note 205, at 447 (explaining rationale for
development of McDonnell Douglas analysis).
236

Brookins, supra note 69, at 983-84.

237

See Jones, supra note 7, at 2356 ("For the Court, the fact that the defendant is a liar

does not mean that he is a bigot or a discriminator.").

352

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:305

answer in Hicks. One can see the iron fist of policies and objectives
that the majority most highly values under the velvet glove238 of
one statement: "We have no authority to impose liability upon an
employer for alleged discriminatory employment practices unless an
appropriate factfinder determines, according to proper procedures,
that the employer has unlawfully discriminated. "239
On first reading, that statement seems to be an innocuous
truism.

Under closer scrutiny, however, one should question the
function of that truism in the maj ority's opinion. The Court is
saying that it is powerless to impose liability on employers, who
have free reign to act under their prerogatives and the employ
ment-at-will doctrine, unless they are found to have violated federal
employment discrimination law. Of course, the very issue in the
case is, when must the fact finder be required to find discrimination
as a matter of law .
Thus, the Court's circuitous statement is a poor attempt to justify
its holding in Hicks as the correct and inevitable interpretation of
the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. In truth, the
statement reveals that the Court chose not to exercise its power by
requiring the fact finder to find discrimination when plaintiffs
prove pretext, because the Court values employment at will more
highly than employment discrimination law and its underlying
policies.
Although the majority did not explicitly articulate its subordina
tion of employment discrimination law and its policies to the
putatively uncontrollable force of employment at will, neither did
it mask that subordination well. Indeed, the dissent exposed the
majority's ordering of policies, discerning "no reason why Title VII
interpretation should be driven by concern for employers who are
too ashamed to be honest in court, at the expense of victims of

238 The "fist inside the velvet glove" metaphor is borrowed from Justice
Harlan's opinion
in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 ( 1964). In that case, the Court used the
metaphor to explain how an employer's announcement during a union organizing campaign
that it would provide improved benefits could actually be a veiled threat in violation of
§ 8(aXl) ofthe National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1988), because employees
would understand that the source of the benefits also could withhold them in the future. Id.
at 409.
239 St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 1 13 S. Ct. 2742, 2751 ( 1993).
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discrimination who do not happen to have direct evidence of
discriminatory intent."240
Several Hicks commentators have posited that although the
treatment of presumptions and the standard for judgments as a
matter of law would be unobj ectionable in general civil litigation,
they are inappropriate in an action involving legislation intended
to implement social policies, such as those underlying discrimina
tion law.241 Its protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Court was not without power to adopt a pretext-only interpretation
of the third stage of McDonnell Douglas. Instead, the Court's
choice of an interpretation in Hicks was driven by policies and
values other than those embodied in employment discrimination
law.242
The Supreme Court's meek admission of powerlessness to control
employment at will, while patently incorrect, has a long lineage in
the Court's employment discrimination decisions. The admission
traces back to Furnco, in which the Court warned lower courts that
they were competent neither to evaluate employers' business
practices nor to suggest substitute practices that would be less
discriminatory. 243 In Hicks, the Court honed this language and
articulated more clearly its powerlessness to prevent employment

240

Id. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court's
1992-1993 Term: A Review of Labor and Employment Law Cases, 9 LAB. LAW. 603, 625-26
(1993) (attributing majority's and dissent's different interpretations of third stage of
McDonnell Douglas to majority's focus on employment-at-will doctrine and dissent's focus on
fairness).
24 1
E.g. , Brookins, supra note 69, at 953; The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note
85, at 349, 351.
242 Explaining why the Court attached a presumption of discrimination when a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, Blumoff and Lewis state:
Title Vll's very existence as a legislative statement of social policy demands
this presumption. . . . Presumptions . . . necessarily reflect normative
decisions. In Title VII the prescription is to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace, but that goal leaves open critical overriding and interrelated
issues. What kinds of discrimination should be eliminated, how, and at what
cost? That presumptions mirror social values does not mean that only
normative considerations apply to our decisions to create presumptions. It
does insist, however, that public values are a necessary component of that
decision.
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 10-11.
243 See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text (discussing Furnco's admonition to
courts not to second-guess employers).
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at will from masking employment discrimination. This proclama
tion of judicial weakness would become even stronger in McKen
non.244
The practical effect of Hicks is likely to be that victims of
discrimination will sue less often, and those who do sue are more
likely to settle for less or to lose their cases. 245 Thus, employment
at will subordinates employment discrimination law at two levels.
First, the policies of management prerogative prevail over employ
ment discrimination policies in Hicks. Second, because of the effect
of Hicks on potential plaintiffs, employers are able to operate
almost as though employment discrimination law does not impinge
on employment at will at all.246
Hicks was recognized as a
significant defeat by supporters of employment discrimination law,
and although several bills were introduced in Congress in 1993 to
overturn the decision, 247 none passed.

c. Treatment of "Liars" and the Coming of McKennon. 248 The
majority and the dissent in Hicks engaged in a colloquy regarding
whether employers whose reasons are determined to be pretextual
are "liars," and whether that issue should affect the Court's
interpretation of the third stage of McDonnell Douglas. The dissent

244

See infra notes 273-326 and accompanying text (discussing McKennon).

246

Culp, supra note 107, at 1010.
See Jones, supra note 7, at 2358 (arguing that, because Hicks precludes comparative

246

and pretext evidence as necessarily proving discrimination, Court has "close[d] the circle that
defines a sphere of autonomy and sovereignty for the employer to decide whom to hire, fire,
or promote").
�7 S. 1776, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3680, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.

2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1993); H.R. 2867, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The text ofH.R.
2787 and H.R. 2867 is reproduced in Brookins, supra note 69, at 943 n.17. S. 1776 and H.R.

3680 were companion bills introduced in the Senate by Senator Howard Metzenbaum and
in the House by Representative Major Owens. Congress Moves to Overturn Hicks Ruling,

DAILY LAB. REP., Dec. 9, 1993, at A-16. The Clinton Administration endorsed S. 1776, the
Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act, which the Justice Department characterized as "a
carefully drafted, straightforward reversal of [Hicks]." Letter from Assistant Att'y Gen.
Sheila F. Anthony to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy on S. 1776 (Sept. 13, 1 994), reprinted in

DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 7, 1994, at E-1 to E-3. However, the bill did not make it out of
committee. Malamud, supra note 134, at 2236 n.28.
248
[T)he Court frequently finds itself in areas whose full contours
are revealed
only as case law expands. Still, shadows from the unfolding landscape can
be seen, and in dicta the Court indicates its anticipated course. Thus, by the
time the foreseen issues actually reach the Court, the decisions are fairly
predictable.
Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 6, at 73.
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repeatedly referred to employers whose reasons are found to be
pretextual as "liars"249 and denounced the majority for adopting
an approach that rewards liars.250
The majority rejected the dissent's labelling of all employers
whose reasons are not believed as "liars"251 but conceded that
some employers will be lying when they offer legitimate reasons for
their employment decisions. 252 The majority expressed surprise,
however, that the dissent would impose Title VII liability as
punishment for an employer's lying because Title VII is not
intended to punish perjury.253 Moreover, noted the majority, the
dissent's "judgment-for-lying" scheme is not fair or symmetrical
because, in part, "the plaintiff is permitted to lie about absolutely
everything without losing a verdict he otherwise deserves."254
The majority's pronouncements provide a solid basis for comparing
the Court's treatment of employment at will and employment
discrimination law after its decision in McKennon, as that case
addresses issues arising when employees are liars or malefactors.
Interestingly, during the period between Hicks and McKennon,
the Court decided a case under the National Labor Relations Act
involving an employee who lied to his employer and to an adminis
trative law judge. In ABF Freig h t Sys., Inc. v. NLRB,255 the
Court considered the remedy due an employee who had been
discharged by his employer for filing an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer and for participating in the grievances of
other discharged employees. 256 The employee had lied to his
employer about the reason he was late for work on the occasion
leading to his termination and then repeated the lie in a hearing

249 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2764 & nn.12-13 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
250 Id. at 2764 n.13 ("Under the majority's scheme, the employer who is caught in a lie,
but succeeds in injecting into the trial an unarticulated reason for its actions, will win its
case and walk away rewarded for its falsehoods.").
251 Id. at 2754 ("To say that [a) company which in good faith introduces such testimony
. . . becomes a liar and a perjurer when the testimony is not believed, is nothing short of
absurd.").
252 Id.

253 Id.

254 Id. at 2755.

255 114 S. Ct. 835 (1994).
256 ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 585, 589, 591 (1991).
The discharge violated
§§ 8(aX 1 ) (3) and (4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aX1), (3) & (4) ( 1 988) .
,
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before an administrative law judge.257 Having concluded that the
employer discriminatorily discharged the employee i n violation of
the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board ordered the make
whole relief of immediate reinstatement o f the employee to his job
with full backpay,258 and the Tenth Circuit enforced the Board's
order.259 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the following
question:

"Does an employee forfeit the remedy of reinstatement

with backpay after the Administrative Law Judge finds that he
purposefully testified falsely during the administrative hear
ing?"2so
The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, thus granting enforcement
of the Board's order, but the Court's opinion and the concurring
opinions suggested the Court was doing so based strictly on the
deference due the Board as the NLRA's administering and inter
preting agency.261

Although expressing concern over rewarding

a plaintiffs perjury, the Court acknowledged that some of the
employer's testimony also had been discredited by the adminis
trative law judge. 262 Thus, the Court reasoned, it would not be
fair to punish the employee for his lies by denying his remedies, as
such a decision also would indirectly reward the employer's lack of
candor.263
The most notable aspect of ABF Freight, in the aftermath of
Hicks and as a prelude to McKennon, is Justice Scalia's grudging
concurrence.
Justice Scalia, the author of the Hicks majority
opinion, did not care for the lies of the employee at all, nor was he
pleased by the Board's failure to deny, or at least to consider
denying, backpay and reinstatement.264 Justice Scalia accused
the Board of "an unseemly toleration of perjury."265
After a
scathing attack on the Board's decision, in which he provided
instruction on the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, Justice

ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 837.
Freight, 304 N.L.R.B. at 591.
25
9 Miera v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 441 (10th
260 AB
F Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 839 n.8.

257

258 AB
F

261
262
263

Id. at 839-40, 842.
Id. at 840.

Id.

2
64 Id. at 842 (Scalia,
265
Id. at 841.

J., concurring).

Cir. 1992).

1996]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

357

Scalia concluded, "I concur in the judgment of the Court that the
NLRB did nothing against the law, and regret that it missed an
opportunity to do something for the law."266
One may be forgiven for asking why the author of the Hicks
majority opinion would speak in favor of punishing lying employees
by depriving them of their remedies when they have been discrimi
nated against. After all, in Hicks Justice Scalia and the majority
had been unwilling to equate an employer's presentation of a
pretextual reason for its adverse employment action with a coverup
for discriminatory motivation. In addition, Justice Scalia and the
Hicks majority rejected the dissent's label of "liar" for an employer
whose articulated reason was not believed by the factfinder. 267
Yet, in ABF Freight Justice Scalia asserted that the Court erred by
comparing the "ABF managers' disbelieved testimony concerning
motivations for firing and [the employee's] crystal-clear lie that he
was where he was not."268

Justice Scalia's distinction, which

would avoid inconsistency between his Hicks and ABF Freight
opinions, raises an interesting point that goes back to Hicks.
The difference between the "crystal-clear lie" and the "disbelieved
testimony concerning motivations" is that the former deals with the
state of objective facts, whereas the latter deals with subjective
intent or motivation. A crystal-clear lie can be objectively dis
proved, as it was in ABF Freight by a deputy sheriff who testified
as to what he saw when he stopped the employee's car.269 Testi
mony concerning motivations cannot be so easily disproved,
however, because we cannot look into an employer's mind and
capture the thought processes at the time an employment decision
is made.
This is precisely why circumstantial evidence is so
important to plaintiffs and why many think that a plaintiffs
demonstration of pretext at the third stage of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis should be sufficient to conclude as a matter of law
that an employer's reasons were discriminatory.
When, if ever, does the disbelieved testimony become a lie, or
come close enough to a lie, so as to justify visiting adverse conse-

266

Id. at 843.
267 See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing Hicks majority's denigration of
dissent's characterization of lying employers as "absurd").
268 ABF Freight, 114 S. Ct. at 842 (Scalia, J. , concurring).
:zGs Id. at 837 n.3.
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quences on the employer proffering the disbelieved testimony? Is
the heart of the difference really that, while both employees and
employers lie, employers shoul d not be punished for those lies
connected to terminations and other adverse employment actions
because employers can terminate for good reasons, bad reasons, or
no reason at all?270
Some commentators predicted that ABF
Freight provided some indication of how the Court would decide the
after-acquired evidence issue before it in McKennon. 271 I think
it did.
2.

McKennon: Gutting the Remedies.
It's because he stays out there, right under the w indow,
hammering and sawing on that . . . box. Where she's got
to see him. Where every breath she draws is full of his
knocking and sawing where she can see him saying See.
See what a good one I am making for you. I told him to
go somewhere else. I said Good God do you want to see
her in it. 272

In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. , 273 the unani
mous Court finally purported to be doing something good for
employment discrimination law by deciding the employer liability
issue in after-acquired evidence cases in a way that favors the
policies underlying that law.
Upon closer examination of the
Court's opinion, however, one discovers a different message in the
Court's holding on the issue of limitations on liability: the Court
continues creating a coffin for employment discrimination law and

270 This is the very rationale some courts employ when denying an employee's claim for
relief in a fraud-in-termination case. For example, in Stromberger v. 3M Co., 990 F.2d 974

(7th Cir. 1993), the plaintiff sued his former employer, claiming that the employer induced
him to accept an early severance plan through fraudulent misrepresentations regarding its
expectations of him if he remained in his job and regarding the outcome should he fail to
meet those expectations. Id. at 976. The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could not
establish the prima facie elements of fraud:

the alleged misrepresentations caused no

damage because, under the employment-at-will doctrine, the employer could have fired him
for any reason or no reason. Id. at 977.
271 E.g. , Charles S . Mishkind, The Use of "After-Acquired" KMwledge of Either Prehire
Misrepresentations or Post-hire Misconduct in Employment Litigation and Arbitration., in.
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, supra note 205, at 3, 18-19.
272 WILLIAM FAULKNER, As I LAY DYING 14 (Random House 1964) ( 1930).
273 1 15 S. Ct. 879 ( 1995).
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its policies. Construction has continued for many years, and now
the coffin is almost complete. McKennon is, perhaps, the most
definitive subordination of federal employment discrimination law
to the employment-at-will doctrine to date.

a. The Decision and Analysis.
i. The Decision. In McKennon, the plaintiff was a 62 year
old secretary who, after working for the defendant for almost forty
years, was terminated in 1990, allegedly pursuant to a reduction in
force.274

McKennon filed an action alleging she was discharged

because of her age in violation of the ADEA and the Tennessee
Human Rights Act.275 During the plaintiffs deposition, the defen
dant learned that while the plaintiff was still working as a
secretary for the defendant, she had copied and removed from its
office several confidential documents. 276 McKennon explained her
actions as based on her concerns for job security: she copied the
documents to give her "insurance" and "protection" against
discharge. 277 Two days after the revelations in the deposition, the
defendant sent McKennon a letter notifying her again of her
termination, this time based on her actions regarding the docu
ments, conduct which violated her job responsibilities.278 Fur
thermore, the letter advised McKennon that had the defendant
known of her actions, it would have terminated her immediately for
that reason. 279

The defendant then filed a motion for summary

judgment, supported by an affidavit from the company president in
which

he

asserted

that

the

Nashville

Banner would have

terminated McKennon at once had it learned of her actions before
0
The district court granted the
her (first) discharge occurred. 28

274 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn.
1992), affd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), reu'd, 1 15 S . Ct. 879 (1995).
215
Id.
276 Id. at 605-06. The documents were the following: a Nashville Banner Fiscal Period
Payroll Ledger; a Nashville Banner Publishing Co., Inc., Profit and Loss Statement; an
agreement between the Nashville Banner and one of its managing employees; and a few
notes and memoranda. Id.
27
7 Id. at 606. Ms. McKennon was concerned that she would be discharged because of her
age, and she thought these documents regarding the employer's financial condition might
help her. McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 883.
278
McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 883.
219

280

Id.

McKennon, 797 F. Supp. at 608.
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motion under the rule, established in Summers v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 281 that "after-acquired" evi
dence of misconduct that would have resulted in discharge of an
employee precludes recovery by that employee in an action under
employment discrimination statutes.282
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, repeating the circuit's
adherence to the Summers rule.283
The court rejected the
plaintiffs attempt to distinguish her case based on the connection
between her misconduct and her discrimination claim,284 instead
holding that the only issue in an after-acquired evidence case is
"whether the employer would have fired the plaintiff employee on
the basis of the misconduct had it known of the misconduct."285
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in McKennon to resolve
the split in the circuits on the after-acquired evidence issue it had
attempted to resolve two years earlier.286 In a unanimous opin
ion, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. First, the Court pro
claimed the purpose of the ADEA and Title VII (" 'the elimination
of discrimination in the workplace' ")287 and the objectives of
these statutes (deterrence and compensation).288 Next, the Court
acknowledged the role of private litigants in effecting these
statutory objectives.289 Accordingly, the Court declared that to
treat after-acquired evidence as precluding all relief would be
inconsistent with this scheme of combatting discrimination.290

281

864 F.2d 700 ( 10th Cir. 1988).
Id . at 709. The Sixth Circuit had adopted the Summers rule in Johnson v. Honeywell
Info. Sys., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
283 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993),
rev'd, 1 15
S. Ct. 879 (1995).
2&1 The court understood McKennon's argument to be that because her misconduct
was
to prevent her employer from discriminating against her because of her age, the Summers
282

rule should not apply. Id. at 543.
285 Id.
288
The Court had granted certiorari in a similar case in 1993, but the parties settled, and
the case was dismissed. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 1 13 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 1 14 S. Ct. 22 ( 1 993).
287 McKennon, 1
15 S. Ct. at 884 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756
(1979)).
288
Id.
289 Id
.
290 Id.
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The Court then turned its attention to Summers and explained
that the Tenth Circuit's reliance in that case on Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle291 was misplaced
because it ignored a significant difference between mixed-motives
cases and after-acquired evidence cases: in mixed-motives cases,
the employer actually knows of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating the employee at the time it makes the
decision, whereas in after-ac quired evidence cases the employer
learns of the legitimate reason only after it takes the action.292
However, the Court had not finished its explication of after
The Court next
acquired evidence by overruling Summers .
embarked u pon a discussion of how Title VII and the ADEA do not
wholly supersede the legitimate prerogatives of employers.293
Invoking language from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,294 in which
it most forcefully insisted that management prerogatives must be
balanced against the rights created by discrimination law, 295 the
Court focused on the legitimate rights of the employer that
survived adoption of the employment discrimination statutes. The
Court concluded that, in view of the balance between employers'
prerogatives and the statutory rights of discrimination victims,
after-ac quired evidence may limit the remedies that a plaintiff can
recover296 if the employer can "establish that the wrongdoing was

In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court considered the claim of a
291 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
teacher for whom the school board based a refusal to rehire on both a legitimate reason and
a reason that violated his constitutional free speech rights. The Court held that causation
would be evaluated in two stages. First, if the plaintiff could prove that the protected
conduct of the employee was a "substantial factor" or a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision, the burden of proof would shift to the employer. Id. at 287. Second, if the employer
proves that it would have reached the same decision for a legitimate reason, relief would not
necessarily be proper. Id. Thus, the court adopted a "but-for" causation test for liability in
mixed-motives cases.
292 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
293 Id. at 886.
294 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
295 See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text (discussing Court's decision in Price

Waterhouse).
296

Regarding remedies, Title VII provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice . . ., the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
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of such severity" that the employer would have terminated the
employee for that reason alone, had it known of the wrongdoing at
the time of discharge. 297
First, the Court concluded that, "as a general rule," reinstate
ment and front pay are not appropriate remedies, as ordering
reinstatement

would

be

"both

inequitable

and

pointless.

"298

Second, the Court held that backpay may be reduced , reasoning
that when an employer discovers evidence that would have resulted
in discharge, the Court "cannot require the employer to ignore the
information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in
a suit against the employer and even if the information might have
gone undiscovered absent the suit. "299

Thus, the Court adopted

a "date-of-discovery" rule for reducing backpay. The C ourt left to
lower courts the issue of whether other "extraordinary equitable
circumstances" should be considered in determining the remedy in
a particular case.

300

Finally, the Court recognized that its holding might give employ
ers an incentive to oppose discrimination claims by conducting
extensive inquiries into employees' backgrounds and job perfor
01
mances. 3
Labelling this a "not insubstantial" concern,3 02 the

back pay . . . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) ( 1 988 & Supp. V 1993). The ADEA, at issue in McKennon, provides
for similar remedies. Because the ADEA incorporates the remedial provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, it additionally provides for liquidated damages for willful violations.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 ( 1991), amended
Title VII and the ADA (and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) to make compensatory and
punitive damages available under a disparate treatment theory ifthe plaintiff cannot recover
such damages under § 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b) (Supp. V 1993). Compensatory
damages are available for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,

mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses." § 1981a(bX3).
Punitive damages may be recovered if the plaintiff proves that the defendant "engaged in a

discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." § 198la(bX1). However, any
compensatory and punitive damages award (excluding, of course, any such damages awarded
under § 1981) will be capped, ranging from a low of $50,000 to a high of $300,000, depending
on the number of employees employed by the defendant. § 198la(bX3).
297 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 1 15 S. Ct. 879,
886 ( 1995).
298 Id.
299 Id. (emphasis added).
300 Id.
301 Id. at 887.
302 Id.
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Court nevertheless disposed of the concern in summary fashion,
opining that the authority of courts to award attorney's fees under
the ADEA and the power to impose sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "will deter most abuses. "303
Prior to the Court's decision in McKennon, a majority of the
federal circuit courts considering the after-acquired evidence issue
followed
the
Summers
rule.
The
Fourth,304
Sixth,305
Eighth,306 and Tenth307 Circuits, and some panels of the Sev
The Third Circuit309 and
enth Circuit,308 followed the rule.
some panels of the Seventh Circuit310 rejected the Summers rule's

303

Jd.

304

E.g. , Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614, 623-24 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 832 (1984). Smallwood preceded Summers and was relied on by the Tenth Circuit in
its Summers decision. One commentator considers it unclear whether the Fourth Circuit
would have followed Summers. See Parker, supra note 120, at 404 n.4 (questioning Fourth
Circuit's pre-Summers adherence to rule announced in that case and distinguishing
Smallwood on ground that employer in Smallwood could easily prove it would have quickly
discovered and acted upon after-acquired evidence ifit had processed plaintiff's application).
However, two post-Summers district court decisions in the Fourth Circuit found the
Summers approach to be consistent with Smallwood. Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan,
859 F. Supp. 963, 976 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Rich v. Westland Printers, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
1 42,856, at 78,730-31 (D. Md. 1993).
306 E.g. , Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 304-05 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 1 13 S. Ct. 2991, and cert. dismissed, 1 14 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Johnson v. Honeywell
Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992) (involving wrongful discharge claim rather
than discrimination claim).
306 E.g. ,

Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit's·

adherence to Summers was qualified by its refusal in Welch to grant summary judgment in
favor of the employer based solely on the employer's assertions in an affidavit that it would
not have hired, and would have fired, the plaintiff had it known of the information. The
court stated that an employer "bears a substantial burden of establishing that the policy pre
dated the hiring and firing of the employee in question and that the policy constitutes more
than mere contract or employment application boilerplate." Id. at 1406. The court concluded
that the employer's "self-serving" affidavit did not satisfy that heavy burden but did not
decide that an unopposed employer affidavit could never satisfy the burden. Id.
307

E.g. , Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 1988);
Jackson v. Integra, Inc., Nos. 92-5143, 92-5153, 1994 WL 379305, at **2 (10th Cir. 1994).
308

E.g. , Washington

v.

Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Gilty v.

Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding plaintitl's misrepresen
tation of his academic credentials in seeking promotion precluded viable claim for disparate
treatment or disparate impact); infra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing turbulent
state of affairs in Seventh Circuit on after-acquired evidence issue).
309 E.g. , Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 1 15 S. Ct. 1397 ( 1995).
310
E.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodserv. Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1993). The
Seventh Circuit panel reached its result in Kristufek without even citing Washington or Gilty,

in which the circuit had held that after-acquired evidence of misrepresentation could bar
recovery.

To confuse matters further, neither Washington nor Gilty cited the Seventh

364

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:305

preclusion of all remedies, although both recognized that after
acquired evidence may affect the remedies available to the p laintiff.
In addition, an Eleventh Circuit panel had rejected the Summers
rule in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co. ,311 and that decision
became the battle standard of the many commentators decrying the
remedy preclusion rule. However, before McKennon was decided,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated its opinion and granted rehearing en
bane in Wallace.
Notwithstanding the support for the Summers rule in most
federal appellate courts, the Supreme Court's rejection of the rule
was predictable and the only reasonable decision. The Summers
rule was overwhelmingly criticized by commentators.312

Most

Circuit's earlier decision in Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1989),
which, while cognizant of Summers, refused to adopt its reasoning. See Mar<kll, 31 F.3d at
1227-28 n. 11 (discussing Seventh Circuit's "bouncing back and forth between the two camps
for a while"); Dale R. Crider, Dishonesty in the Employment Relationship , 7 CHI. B. Ass'N
REC. 16, 17 (Sept. 1993) (discussing Seventh Circuit's mysterious turnaround in Kristufek).
The Eighth Circuit in Welch cited Washington for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit
followed the majority approach of barring recovery in cases of after-acquired evidence.
Welch, 23 F.3d at 1405.
311
968 F.2d 1 174, 1180 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (holding evidence of employee's application fraud,
discovered after filing of suit, could not serve as legitimate cause for terminating employee
and arguing that "Summers rule is antithetical to the principal purpose of Title VII
. "),
reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 ( 1 1th Cir. 1994).
312
See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 19, at 3 7 1 (criticizing Summers formulation); Ann C.
McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evi<knce in
.

.

.

Title VII Litigation , 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 148-50 (1993) (arguing against Summers rule and
pointing out that enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1991 made that approach to after-acquired
evidence completely untenable); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use ofPredischarge Misconduct
Discovered After an Employees' [sic] Termination as a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 ( 1990) (noting "the unspoken evil of the after the fact defense is that
some employers will be able to avoid total responsibility for their unlawful employment
practices, such as employment discrimination"); Sprang, supra note 19, at 165 (decrying both
remedy-preclusion approach of Summers and, to lesser extent, remedy-reduction approach
adopted by Court in McKennon); Rebecca H. White & Robert D. Brussack, The Proper Role

ofAfter-Acquired Evi<knce in Employment Discrimination Litigation , 35 B.C. L. REV. 49, 54
(1993) (criticizing approach to after-acquired evidence defense emerging in lower courts);

Mills, supra note 19, at 1526 (arguing Summers "is unjust and inconsistent with the
purposes of both Title VII and the ADEA"); Parker, supra note 120, at 404 (noting Summers
approach to after-acquired evidence is problematic); Zemelman, supra note 20, at 2 1 1 (calling
for "bar [on] the use of after-acquired evidence to immunize employers in discrimination
cases"). But see William M. Muth, Jr., Note, The After-Acquired Evi<knce Doctrine in Title
VII Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1 1 74
(11th Cir. 1992), 72 NEB. L. REV. 330, 332, 348 (1993) (noting wide support for Summers
doctrine and need for "a system that keeps the essential element of the doctrine as
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commentators and the federal appellate courts rejecting Summers
pointed out that the Summers rule was based on an ill-conceived
analogy to mixed-motives cases.313 In mixed-motives cases, the
employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons
at the time of its decision.
In after-acquired evidence cases,
however, the employer necessarily could only have been motivated
by the illegitimate reason. This point was made clear in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins314 when the Supreme Court, extending the
mixed-motives analysis of Mt. Healthy to Title VII cases, stated,
"[a]n employer may not . . . prevail in a mixed-motives case by
offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that
reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision. "315
ii.
Two Pre-McKennon Approaches to After-Acquired
Evidence. Although a general consensus existed among commenta
tors that the remedy preclusion rule ofSummers should be rejected,

there was little agreement on the effect after-acquired evidence
should have on remedies. Unfortunately, prior to McKennon the
EEOC took the position that the proper approach to after-acquired
evidence permitted its use to cut off backpay from the date of
discovery and to preclude reinstatement or front pay. The EEOC
further allowed compensatory damages for the period prior to the
date of discovery and punitive damages consistent with the Civil
Rights Act of 199 1 .316 Under the EEOC's approach, if the date of
discovery was unknown, a date would be approximated and a
corresponding reduction made in backpay and compensatory
damages.317
The preclusion of reinstatement or front pay and the severance
of backpay at the · date of discovery had substantial support among

established in Summers").
313 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1229; Wallace, 968 F . 2d at 1180; see also supra note 312 (citing
sources criticizing Summers).
314 490 U.S. 228 ( 1989).
315 Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
6
31 EEOC : REVISED ENFORCEMENT GUIDE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISPARATE
TREATMENT THEORY {1992) [hereinafter EEOC: REVISED ENFORCEMENT GUIDE], reprinted
in 405 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 6915, 6926-28 ( 1995); see also supra note 296 (discussing 1991

Act's provision for compensatory and punitive damages).
317 EEOC: REVISED ENFORCEMENT GUIDE, supra note 316, at 6926.
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commentators. 318 Advocates of this approach opposed requiring
post-discovery backpay and reinstatement for the same reason:
awarding such remedies trammels the legitimate prerogatives of
the employer. 319 While admitting that after-acquired evidence
discovered pursuant to litigation was most troubling, Professors

White and Brussack nevertheless argued that such evidence should
cut off backpay from the date of discovery, reasoning,
Anyone who contemplates bringing an employment
discrimination action must weigh the risk that the
defendant will uncover, in preparing for trial, informa
tion about the plaintiff that triggers a discharge policy.
There is nothing inherently illegitimate about an
employer's acquisition of such information through

pretrial discovery or through its own pretrial investiga
tion.320

Another approach receiving some support was that adopted by
the Third Circuit in Mardell and the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace.
Under that approach, backpay would be cut off before the date of
judgment only if the employer could prove that it would have
discovered the evidence independently of its discriminatory acts
and the resulting litigation, and that it would have taken the same
action against the employee at that time. 321 Although this ap
proach also enjoyed support among some commentators, 322 even
its advocates shied away, more or less, from requiring reinstate-

318

See, e.g. , Davis, supra note 19, at 399 (favoring date-of-discovery approach to limiting
backpay and denying reinstatement); White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 80-91 (advocat
ing severance of backpay from date of discovery and denial of reinstatement at remedial
stage of trial if employer can establish that it would have terminated employee on basis of
after-acquired evidence); Mills, supra note 19, at 1551-55 (advocating position of EEOC
Guidelines).
319
Davis, supra note 19, at 399; White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 84; Mills, supra
note 19, at 1552-53.
320
White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 84.
321
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 3 1 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted
andjudgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174,
1182 ( 1 1th Cir. 1992), reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 ( 1 1th Cir.
1994).
322
E.g. , McGinley, supra note 312, at 197; Sprang, supra note 19, at 157; Zemelman,
supra note 20, at 207-11.
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ment or front pay, based on the following rationale articulated by
the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace :
[A]ssuming that the after-acquired evidence in and of
itself would have caused [the employer] to discharge
[the plaintifl], it would be inappropriate for a court to
order reinstatement or front pay . . . . In other words,
if [the employer] now has a legitimate motive that
would cause [the plaintiff's] discharge, then reinstate
ment or front pay would go beyond making [the plain
tifl] whole and would unduly trammel [the employer's]
freedom to lawfully discharge employees.323
Every commentator and court rejecting Summers while proposing
limitations on employee remedies had one thing in common: they
could not shake free of the grasp of employment at will so evident
in the foregoing quotations from Professors White and Brus
sack324 and from the Eleventh Circuit. 325 Proponents developed
such treatments of after-acquired evidence in an effort to effect the
compensation and deterrence objectives of federal employment
discrimination law, but did so haltingly, ever fearful that they
would trespass upon the forbidden territory of the employer's
traditional prerogatives.
The Eleventh Circuit's approach in
Wallace was the most complete rejection of after-acquired evidence
in an effort to remedy discrimination. Yet even that approach gave
employers the opportunity to use after-acquired evidence to limit
backpay, and it rejected altogether reinstatement and front pay as
appropriate remedies. The proponents of the Wallace position
should instead have advocated reinstatement as a proper remedy
if an employer could not establish that it would have discovered the

323 Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1181-82; see also Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1240 ("[W)here an equitable
remedy, such as reinstatement, would be particularly invasive of the employer's 'traditional
management prerogatives,' the after-acquired evidence may bar that remedy."); McGinley,
supra note 3 12, at 197 (stating even when employers cannot prove they would have
discovered information independently, courts should refuse to reinstate employee);
Zemelman, supra note 20, at 207 (concluding reasoning in Wallace is accurate and
persuasive).
324 See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
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information independently. Moreover, as White and Brussack
recognize, if reinstatement is not available, then neither should full
backpay be available because the purpose of backpay is to make the
plaintiff whole for the period between the adverse employment
action and the time of reinstatement. 326
iii. A Modest Proposal: Full Recovery. Prior to McKennon,
I argued that neither the date-of-discovery approach nor the
Wallace approach was the appropriate treatment of after-acquired
evidence. 327 Instead, I argued, after-acquired evidence should be
considered irrelevant and inadmissible in actions brought under
federal employment discrimination law, with the sole exception
being cases in which the employer could prove that reinstatement
would create a substantial risk to its business, other employees, the
plaintiff, or the public.328 However, the burden of proving this
risk of harm should rest with the employer. I advocated this
approach based on the principle that the objectives of the discrim
ination statutes should be achieved and that the employer's
prerogatives should be displaced to the extent necessary to achieve
those objectives.
Thus, my proposal would award full backpay and reinstatement
under most circumstances. Are full backpay and reinstatement
really necessary to accomplish the objectives of employment
The Supreme Court fully addressed the
discrimination law?
importance of the backpay remedy in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody.329 In Albemarle Paper Co. , the Court first explained that
backpay deters discriminatory conduct by " 'provid[ing] the spur or
catalyst which causes employers . . . to self-examine and to self-

26
3

White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 84; accord Mills, supra note 19, at 1552-53.
This argument was included in my presentation before the Tenth Annual National
Conference on Labor and Employment Law, identified supra note *.
328 Cf Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 n.31 (3d Cir. 1994)
(recognizing need for such exception at remedies stage of trial to avoid reinstatement if
general rule existed that otherwise excluded "tainted" after-acquired evidence obtained
through retaliatory investigations by employers), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 115
S. Ct. 1397 (1995); McGinley, supra note 312, at 197 (stating courts should deny reinstate
ment, even when employer cannot prove it would have discovered information independently,
if employer proves reinstatement would cause it "serious harm"); Sprang, supra note 19, at
156-57 (arguing against reinstatement when employer or public is exposed to possibility of
substantial harm).
329 422 U.S. 405 ( 1975).
327
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evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate,
so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignomini
ous page in this country's history.' "330 The Court explained that
backpay is relevant to the compensation objective because, like all
make-whole compensation, it attempts to put the plaintiff in the
same position she would have been in but for the discriminatory
conduct.331
The Court then cautioned that a backpay award
should not be denied unless the reasons for denial, "if applied
generally," would not frustrate the dual objectives of the employ
ment discrimination statutes.332
In light of the Court's conclusions on backpay, those who would
allow after-acquired evidence to cut off that remedy prior to
judgment bear the burden of demonstrating how doing so avoids
frustrating the objectives of discrimination law.
The date-of
discovery proponents argued that allowing full backpay would
overcompensate plaintiffs by placing them in a better position than
they would have been absent the discrimination. 333 This proposi
tion is wrong for several reasons. First, it fails to recognize that,
in most cases, the employer would not have discovered the after
acquired evidence absent its illegal acts and the ensuing litiga
tion.334 Moreover, the date-of-discovery approach does not require
the employer to prove that it would have discovered the after
acquired evidence independently.
Second, the overcompensation argument assumes the only injury
being redressed is the plaintiffs job loss (or similar results of the
employer's adverse action). The argument fails to recognize the
plaintiffs psychological injury from being treated as "less than

330

Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N. L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
Id. at 418-21.
332 Id. at 421.
333 E.g. , White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 82; Mills, supra note 19, at 1547-48.
334 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1239 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. gran�d
and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995). The Third Circuit stated the following in
Mardell:
33 1

Insofar as after-acquired evidence is uncovered during the legal dispute and
would not have been discovered, at least for an indeterminate stretch of time,
absent the employer's unlawful acts, the plaintiff would be left in a worse
position because of the discrimination if the court were to make use of that
evidence to limit the victim's remedies, and the make-whole compensatory
goal of the acts would not be reached.

Id.
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human"-being subjugated because of his race, color, sex, national
ity, age, disability, or religion.335
Third, the argument that full b ackpay might overcompensate a
victim of discrimination is unduly emphasized by those who refuse
to interfere with managerial prerogatives to achieve the goals of
discrimination law. Compensation is neither the only objective of
the employment discrimination statutes nor the most important.
Even if a full backpay award resulted in overcompensation, that
result would be more consistent with the broader goal of eradicat
ing discrimination in the workplace. 336
Finally, any approach that cuts off backpay before judgment
would interfere with the deterrence objective of the statutes. Prior
to McKennon, attorneys and consultants advising clients on the
after-acquired evidence doctrine advised employers to take full
advantage of the Summers remedy-preclusion approach by creating
opportunities

for

employees

to

make

misrepresentations

on

employment documents, by routinely searching for such misrepre
sentations, and by establishing a low threshold for discharge.337
This advice will not change now that after-acquired evidence can
be used only to reduce significantly a plaintiffs remedies rather
than to bar them altogether.338
The rationales in favor of awarding full backpay also militate in

335 Weber, supra note 168, at 534; see also Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1232 (describing
"dehumanizing injury as real as, and often of far more severe and lasting harm than, a blow
to the jaw").
Such injuries arguably will be compensated now that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides
for compensatory damages, see supra note 296 (discussing compensatory damages provision
of Act), and thus backpay need not be used in such a manner. Because the plaintiff's claim
in McKennon was under the ADEA, under which compensatory and punitive damages were
(and still are) unavailable, the Supreme Court did not address the effect of after-acquired
evidence on such damages. In Enforcement Guidance issued after McKennon, the EEOC
takes the position that only "out-of-pocket losses, analogous to backpay" should be cut off as
of the date of discovery. EEOC: GUIDANCE ON AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE, reprinted in 405
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 7331, 7335 (Dec. 14, 1995). In contrast, compensatory damages for
emotional harm should not be limited to the date of discovery. Id. at 7336. Furthermore,
the EEOC takes the position that after-acquired evidence bars neither liquidated damages
under the ADEA or the Equal Pay Act nor punitive damages. Id. at 7336-37.
336 Weber, supra note 168, at 530-31.
337 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236 n.26; see also Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Corp., 968 F.2d 1 1 74,
1 180 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (explaining Summers rule "invites employers to establish ludicrously
low thresholds for 'legitimate' termination and to devote fewer resources to preventing
discrimination"), reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 ( 1 1th Cir. 1994).
338 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236-37, 1239; see also infra notes 378-395 and accompanying text
(discussing issue further).

1996]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

371

favor of awarding reinstatement. 339 Reinstatement as an employ
ment discrimination remedy relates to both of the objectives of
employment discrimination law.340 To award something less or
something different is to undercompensate and underdeter.
Commentators on the subject of make-whole relief have identified
several important consequences of denying reinstatement. 341
First, employees who are dismissed for discriminatory reasons are
stigmatized by their dismissals and are likely to take longer
obtaining other jobs than are employees who are laid off for
economic reasons.342 Thus, even if front pay is provided in lieu
of reinstatement, that award is not necessarily an adequate
substitute for the plaintiffs former job.343 Second, if employees
discharged for discriminatory reasons cannot be reinstated,
employers will understand that they can discriminate and rid
themselves of unwanted employees for a relatively low price. Thus,
the deterrent impact of discrimination lawsuits is significantly
decreased. 344

Finally, if victims of discrimination are not rein

stated, the message to other employees becomes clear:

they can

lose their jobs, too, notwithstanding their federally protected rights,
and they must be careful about asserting these rights.345 Thus,
the number of "private attorneys general" decreases and, as a
result, the deterrent effect of federal employment discrimination
law diminishes.

339 Corbett, supra note *, at 215-18; see also Parker, supra note 120, at 436.37 (explaining
that Eleventh Circuit in Wallace failed to recognize that denying reinstatement or front pay
would leave plaintiffs in worse position than they would have been absent discrimination,
despite recognizing this point regarding backpay). Even date-of-discovery proponents used
this point to criticize supporters of the Wallace approach, asserting they failed to remain
consistent with the underlying premise of their argument for full backpay. See, e.g. , Mills,
supra note 19, at 1548 ("[l]f cutting off back pay at the point of discovery grants a windfall
to employers, why was it not a windfall to the employer in Wallace to avoid front pay,
reinstatement, and injunctive relief based upon the after-acquired evidence?").
340 Weber, supra note 168, at 530-32.
34 1 Benjamin W. Wolk.inson & Victor W. Nichol, The Illusion ofMake-Whole Relief: The
Exclusion of the Reinstatement Remedy in Hostility-Based Discrimination Cases, 8 LAB. LAW.
157, 168-71 (1992).
342 Id. at 169.
343

Id.
Id. at 170.
at 171 ("Reinstatement is not only a remedy for the particular employee
345 Id.
344

discharged, but is also an attempt to lessen the effects of the discharge on the remaining
employees.").
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While arguing that reinstatement should not be generally
prohibited in

after-acquired evidence cases,

I recognize that
reinstatement does not always accomplish the objective of returning
a plaintiff to long-term employment with the same employer.
Empirical evaluations of reinstatement under the National Labor
Relations Act indicate that most plaintiffs offered reinstatement
refuse to return, and most of those who accept reinstatement
remain on the job for less than two years.346 That fact notwith
standing, reinstatement is an important remedy that should not be
barred.

It may be that most discrimination victims holding

judgments entitling them to reinstatement would settle with
employers by "trading in" their reinstatement right for more
money.347 Even so, the choice rightly remains in the hands of the
victim. In litigating employment discrimination cases, I encoun
tered cases in which the plaintiffs would not trade reinstatement
for money because they needed the job.

Moreover, I also encoun

tered employers who were far more upset by being required to
reinstate a discrimination victim than by any monetary award.
The attitude of such employers-that they should be entitled to
discriminate for a price-is the very reason why reinstatement is
an irreplaceable remedy for violations of federal employment
discrimination law. In the words of the Court in Albemarle Paper
Co. , such employers need to see the reinstated employee back on
the job to spur them " 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page
in this country's history.' "348
My proposal for treating after-acquired evidence is like that of
Professor Mark Weber, who proposed that courts should award full

348 Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. l, 28-32. Although Professor West concludes that reinstatement is not an effective

make-whole remedy, she recognizes two unique advantages of the remedy. First, even if the
reinstated employee remains on the job for only a short time, the reinstatement itself may
remove the stigma of discharge, thus making it easier for the employee to find another job.

Second, no matter how long it lasts, reinstatement sends a message to the employer that it

did not "get away with" discrimination. Id. at 40.
347 Weber, supra note 168, at 537 n.319.
348 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975) (quoting United States v. N.
L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
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recovery to plaintiffs in mixed-motives cases.349 Weber argued
that such relief is appropriate because it "advances the remedial
goals of compensation, deterrence, and vindication of the communi
ty sense of justice, and satisfies the terms and policies of Title
VII. "350 Moreover, he argued, alternative approaches to remedies
in mixed-motives cases permit "management prerogatives [to]
trump the civil rights of minorities and women."351
In opposing such an approach to after-acquired evidence,
Professors White and Brussack point out that Congress rejected
Weber's full-recovery approach to mixed-motives cases in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.352 In response to White and Brussack, two
points are in order. First, Congress's rejection of Weber's approach
does not mean that it is not the better approach. Second, as both
McKennon and White and Brussack's article recognize, after
acquired evidence cases are not analogous to mixed-motives cases:
the established discriminatory act based on discriminatory motive
alone in after-acquired evidence cases makes the argument for full
relief stronger in such cases than in mixed-motives cases.
For all my protestations that after-acquired evidence should not
affect either liability or remedies, the Supreme Court in McKennon
adopted the

date-of-discovery treatment.

Short of adopting

Summers's remedy preclusion rule, a result that would have been
astounding even for a Court undervaluing employment discrimina
tion law, the Court could not have adopted a more pro-employer
approach than date-of-discovery. Thus, the McKennon decision is
a resounding subordination of employment discrimination law to
employment at will.
b. Same Old Story:

Employment at Will Wins.

The fall of

Summers is much exaggerated. Although the Court rejected the
preclusion of remedies based on after-acquired evidence, it nonethe-

349 Weber, supra note 168, at 538.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 539.
352 White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 82. In the 1991 Act, Congress provided that in

mixed-motives cases in which employers would have taken the same adverse employment
action absent the discriminatory motive, courts may grant declaratory relief, some injunctive
relief, and attorney's fees and costs, but they are prohibited from awarding damages or
ordering reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or other payment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(gX2)(B)
(Supp. V 1993).
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less adopted an approach that will result in victims of discrimina
tion recovering very little . The dissent in Wallace thought it
strange that the majority rejected Summers as an "affirmative
defense," but then accepted it as a limitation on relief.363 Indeed,
what the Supreme Court did in McKennon was kick Summers out
the front door in the first part o f the opinion and then, in the
second part of the opinion, let it in the back door.364
It would be difficult to find a Supreme Court opinion that more
concisely and cogently states the purposes of federal employment
discrimination law than the first part of the McKennon analy
sis. 355 After stating the law's overall goal of eradicating discrimi
nation and its dual objectives of deterrence and compensation, the
Court declared the important role of private litigants in furthering
these objectives. 356 Indeed, the C ourt recognized that the "effica
cy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one measure of the
success of the [ADEAJ. "357 With that prelude, the Court rejected
Summers. 358
Despite having extolled the virtues of discrimination law in the
first part of its analysis, the Court then elevated employment at
will above that law in the second part. One would have to go back
to Price Waterhouse359 to find a more explicit statement that, in
the balance between discrimination victims' statutory rights and
employers' common-law prerogatives, employers' rights win. The
second part of the opinion is chock-full of the minions of employ
ment at will: "legitimate interests of the employer," "employer's
legitimate concerns," "significant other prerogatives and discretions
in the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging of their
employees," "employers' freedom of choice," "lawful prerogatives of

353 Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Corp., 968 F.2d 1 174, 1 188 ( 1 1th Cir. 1992) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting), reh'g en bane granted and opinion vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994).
354 Similarly, the Court explained that the unclean hands defense does not apply to bar
recovery where, as in employment discrimination actions, important public policies are
served by the lawsuit. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 1 1 5 S. Ct. 879, 885
(1995). However, the Court immediately discussed allowing the plaintiffs wrongful act to
reduce the remedy available. Id. at 886.
355 Id. at 884-85.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 885.
356 Id.
359 See supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text (discussing Price Waterhouse).
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the employer," and "employer's rights and prerogatives."360 The
Court, implicitly explaining the wide ambit it is recognizing for
employment at will, explained that the ADEA and Title VII are not
1
a "general regulation of the workplace."36
After utilizing employer prerogatives to rout the discrimination

statutes, the Court adopted the date-of-discovery approach to after
acquired

evidence, proclaiming that "we cannot require the

employer to ignore the information even if it is acquired during the
course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the
information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. "362

The Court has done this before-declared that it is powerless to

prevent the subordination of the employment discrimination
statutes to employment at will.363 The question remains the
same as it was in response to the Court's declarations of incompe
tence and impotence in Furnco and Hicks : Is the correct language
"cannot" or "will not"?
Theoretically, the McKennon Court's elevation of employment at
will over discrimination law is perhaps more troubling than in any
of the prior cases. At least in Furnco, Hicks, and the others, the
Court exalted employers' prerogatives when the plaintiffs had not
proven discrimination (although I realize the Court used the
employers' prerogative principles to conclude that the plaintiffs had
not proven discrimination). In McKennon, the employer, for the
purposes of its motion for summary judgment based on after
acquired evidence, conceded that it had discriminated.364 Thus,
McKennon differed from its predecessors in that no issue existed as
to whether the employer discriminated in violation of federal law.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the
admitted violation of the employment discrimination laws, it must
conduct a balancing of the victim's statutory rights with the
employer's rights in order to avoid trammeling the employer's
rights .365

360 McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 886. Note that all of this language fits into one page in the
reporter.
as1

362

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

363 See supra notes 141-146, 243-244 and accompanying text (discussing Court's general
reluctance in Furnco and Hicks, respectively, to put limits on employment at will).
36'1

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.

365 Id. at 886.
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One might think that when there is an admitted statutory
violation, the Court would be more concerned with giving effect to
the objectives of the statutes and less concerned with trespassing
upon the sacred ground of employers' common-law rights. Employ
ment at will triumphs, however, even when discriminatory
violations are admitted. The Court rushed to preserve the employ
er's rights before ensuring that an admitted violation of employ
ment discrimination law was effectively remedied.
Moreover, McKennon is worse than many of the Court's prior
decisions because it was a unanimous opinion. Hicks, in contrast,
was a five-four decision.
It is troubling that not one justice
expressed a dissent concerning the limitation the Court was
imposing on a plaintiffs remedies. 366
McKennon also presents an interesting contrast to Hicks. In
Hicks, the majority and dissent disagreed about whether a
defendant employer whose articulated reasons for its adverse
actions are found to be pretextual is a liar, and if so, whether that
should result in judgment for the plaintiff.367 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, rejected the idea that such an employer is
necessarily a liar. Even if one concludes the employer is a liar, the
majority argued, Title VII is not a statute designed to punish
perjury.368 As the Court suggested, employment at will renders
the Court powerless to impose liability on lying employers. 369
Moreover, the Hicks majority contended that the dissent's
judgment-for-lying scheme was not symmetrical because plaintiffs
could lie about everything without jeopardizing a judgment to
which they were otherwise entitled. 370
Yet, in after-acquired
evidence cases, where the lying or dishonest party is the employ-

366 See Sullivan & Harrick, supra note 19, at 291 ("It is surprising
that this view was
adopted without a single dissent, since there were compelling arguments against this
position as well as forebodings of abuse.").
367 See supra notes 249-254 and accompanyin g text (discussing
majority and dissenting
opinions in Hicks concerning lying employers).
368 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2754 ( 1993).
369 See s�p a_ note 239 and accompanying text (discussing
�
Court's unwillingness in Hicks
to impose hab1lity based on employer's prevarication).
370 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
•
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ee,371 the Court unanimously responds by imposing a substantial
limitation on the available remedies. If symmetrical treatment
were still important, as the majority suggested in Hicks, the
plaintiff should not be punished for dishonesty in the context of her
employment discrimination action.
Moreover, the dishonesty in after-acquired evidence cases is not
perjury in a court of law or in an administrative proceeding, for
which the Court expressed such disdain in ABF Freight.312 In
sum, given the Hicks Court's tolerance of "liars," who were shielded
from the imposition of liability by employment at will, one would
have thought that dishonest employees would have been given
greater protection by the employment discrimination laws and
policies to prevent a ravaging of their remedies. The difference
may be that the Court values employment at will enough to
tolerate dishonest employers, but does not value the discrimination
laws enough to tolerate dishonest employees.
A final point of concern regarding McKennon is the increasing
privatization of employment discrimination law. A pre McKennon
commentator explained that the evolution among judges, legisla
tors, and others in their views on the purpose of Title VII, from a
statute addressing important public policy concerns to a statute
providing remedies for personal injury claims between private
parties,373 made the Summers rule a palatable approach to after
acquired evidence.374 The Court's opinion in McKennon demon
strates this changing view. The Court discussed the unclean hands
defense and said that it had formerly rejected application of that
-

371 Indeed, the most common after-acquired evidence cases are those involving lies, such
as resume or application fraud. See infra notes 378-379 and accompanying text (noting
common occurrence of "puffing" in job applications). Even cases, such as McKennon , that
involve wrongful conduct other than misrepresentations, still involve dishonesty.
372 See supra notes 255-271 and accompanying text (discussing ABF Freight fully).
373 At least one reason for this evolution is that the vast majority of employment
discrimination actions now involve discharges. Prior to 1977, more actions involved refusals
to hire. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 7, at 1016 fig 7 Furthermore, the shift has been
dramatic: whereas failure-to-hire EEOC charges outnumbered unlawful termination charges
by 50% in 1966, unlawful discharge claims outnumbered failure-to-hire claims by more than
600% in 1985. Id. at 1015. Thus, many have come to believe that discrimination actions no
longer serve the original purpose of opening job markets to discrimination victims who had
been excluded. Id. at 1033. Instead, the discrimination laws have become statutory
wrongful discharge laws. Id.
374 Zemelman, supra note 20, at 193-97.
.

.
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defense " 'where a private suit serves important public purpos
es.' "375 Then, in the next sentence, the Court stated that the
foregoing proposition does not mean that the employee's misconduct
is irrelevant to the remedies available. 376
The Court seems to be saying that it thinks there is nothing
wrong with deemphasizing the compensation objective (which is
directed more toward private purposes) when the plaintiff has
engaged in wrongful conduct. What the Court fails to recognize or
address, however, is the substantial effect that such a limitation
also has on the deterrence obj ective377 (which is directed more
toward the public policies of the law). The Court's decision in
McKennon is not only a product of a belief that employment
discrimination law provides relief in essentially private disputes,
but it is also a portent of the continuing, and perhaps escalating,
privatization of discrimination law. The Court's willingness to
allow after-acquired evidence to strip away most of the plaintiffs
equitable remedies projects its view that employment discrimina
tion law is like any other private law. Bereft of its public policy
banner, employment discrimination law becomes little more than
a statutory-tort exception to employment at will.
As such, it
probably will become even more susceptible to employment at will's
onslaught.
A more serious concern than the theoretical one discussed above
is that McKennon makes circumvention of federal employment
discrimination law both possible and advisable on the practical
level of day-to-day business operations. After-acquired evidence
cases are not rare cases. Although McKennon involved post-hiring
wrongful employee conduct, most after-acquired evidence cases
involve resume or application fraud, in which applicants for jobs
engage in "puffing" of education credentials or work experience to
enhance their chances of employment.378 Such conduct is wide-

375 M�Kennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 ( 1995) (quoting
Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 ( 1968)).
376 Id. at 886.

.

377 see infra notes 378·388 and accompanymg text (highlighting undermining effect
of
McKennon on deterrence objective of discrimination laws).
.

378

White & Brussack, supra note 312, at 53 & n.13.
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spread. 379 While the prevalence of such conduct does not excuse
it, the effect it has on discrimination claims will produce a signifi
cant impact on the overall enforcement of employment discrimina
80
tion law. 3
The Third Circuit in Mardell reviewed the advice given to
employers seeking to take advantage of the Summers approach to
after-acquired evidence. 381 Among that advice: (1) Include on
applications and other employment documents an express state
ment that misrepresentations can result in discharge; (2) When an
employee or former employee sues for employment discrimination,
immediately conduct a thorough investigation to determine whether
there are misrepresentations or other misconduct that can be used
in defense of the suit; and (3) Routinely search for pre-employment
misrepresentations.382

One commentator added that employers

should uniformly apply their policies and, during pre-trial discov
ery, should depose the plaintiff about his application and other
personnel documents "line-by-line" to uncover any misrepresenta
tions.383
Predictably, given the prevalence of misrepresentations, such
exploitation of after-acquired evidence will result in underenforce
ment of the discrimination laws and thereby underdeter discrimina
tion in employment practices.384 Not enough blameless employees
exist to serve the role of "private attorneys general." The Third
Circuit predicted in Mardell that even if Summers were rejected in
favor of the date-of-discovery approach, employers would still be

3
19

Id.; see also Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1236 n.28 (3d Cir.
1994) (citing law review articles supporting proposition that "resume fraud is a serious and
recurrent problem facing employers"), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397
(1995); Rubinstein, supra note 312, at 1 n.2 (noting survey finding 10% of firms experience
application fraud).
380 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236-37.
381
Id. at 1236 n.26.
382
Id. This advice can still be implemented by employers, although they must be careful
to avoid the appearance ofretaliatory investigations. The EEOC takes the position that such
investigations nullify the date-of-discovery cutoff on backpay and justify imposition of
punitive damages. EEOC: GUIDANCE ON AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE, supra note 335, at
7334-36.
383 William S. Waldo & Rosemary A. Mahar, Lost Cause and Found Defense:
Using
Evidence Discovered After an Employee's Discharge to Bar Discrimination Claims, 9 LAB.
LAW. 31, 41-42 ( 1993).
384 Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1236-37.

380

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:305

given the same advice and the deterrence objective of the laws
would still be frustrated to some extent. 385 Has that prediction
proven true? Of course it has. Employers are as likely to receive,
and heed, such advice when the result is a significant reduction in
their liability as when the result is an avoidance of all liability.
For example, one recent publication advised that, in conducting
aggressive discovery and in assessing a plaintiffs damage claims in
a sexual harassment suit, "[a]ll information included on [the]
plaintiffs employment application [is] still relevant to front and
back pay claims after [McKennon]."386
The effect of employers' exploitation of after-acquired evidence
under the McKennon rule probably will not be confined to limiting
the recovery of employees whose claims are resolved at trial.
Rather, as with Hicks , victims of discrimination will sue less often,
and those who sue and settle will do so for less. 387 An employer
is likely to advise current and former employees contemplating suit
that misrepresentation or other misconduct will substantially limit
any recovery. This preemptive strike will more likely dissuade
potential plaintiffs from suing, or persuade plaintiffs to settle early
and for less, than will an explanation of the employer-friendly
interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis under Hicks.
While potential or actual plaintiffs may not understand an
explanation of Hicks, there is some visceral "punch" to the "you had
it coming"388 rationale of McKennon. Feeling ashamed of their
misconduct, or perhaps embarrassed at being "caught," former
employees may give up their claims with a whimper, accepting de

386

Id. at 1236-38.
Hope B. Eastman, A Look at Damages from the Perspective of the Defense Bar, in
SEXUAL lIARAsSMENT LITIGATION 239 (P.L.I. Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 520, 1995).
387 See supra note 245 and accompanying text (predicting as effect of Hicks fewer suits
386

and lower settlements). Perhaps the difference is that those who do sue will be less likely
to lose their cases unless the court conducts the trial such that the after-acquired evidence
taints the factfinder's consideration of the liability issue. After the Mardell judgment
was
vacated to be reconsidered in light of McKennon, the Third Circuit declined to instruct
the
trial court on how to conduct the trial on remand. The court stated, "While bifurcation
may
sometimes be advisable as a vehicle to insure that after-acquired evidence not
be improperly
used d�ring the liability phase, in other cases cautionary instruction
s or stipulations may
render it unnecessary." Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d
1072, 1073 n.2 (3d Cir.
1995).
388

Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1232.
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minimis settlement offers, or they may forego their claims altogeth
er. Thus, the likely effect of the McKennon approach on the
workplace is both undercompensation of discrimination victims and
underdeterrence of discriminatory practices. Employers, armed
with the weaponry McKennon places at their disposal, are able to
operate not wholly under the freedom of employment at will, but
close to it.
Fortunately, McKennon does provide one brake on these projected
results. McKennon may be read as authorizing lower courts to
examine the objective reasonableness of an employer's asserted
reasons for discharge. The Court stated that "[w]here an employer
seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must
first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the
employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds
alone if the employer had known of it at the time of discharge."389
It seems unlikely that the Court meant to authorize courts to
second-guess employer decisions on the ground that the conduct
was insufficiently egregious to justify the adverse action. That
interpretation would be contrary to the Court's admonition in
Furnco that courts are incompetent to devise less discriminatory
practices for employers.390
More likely, that statement meant that a court may inquire into
whether employers have consistently applied their stated practic
es, 391 regardless of whether those practices are objectively reason
able. This interpretation, rather than that permitting an examina
tion of objective reasonableness, is further supported by the Court's
realization that it needed to address the prospect of routine
employer undertakings of extensive discovery into a plaintiffs
background or performance. Unfortunately, the Court's resolution
of that problem is hardly reassuring. In one sentence, the Court
explained that a court's authorization to award attorney's fees by
statute and to impose sanctions under Rule 1 1 in appropriate cases

389 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886-87 (1995).
390 See supra notes 136-149 and accompanying text (discussing Furnco's admonition that
courts not second-guess employers).
391 Sullivan & Harrick, supra note 19, at 291. On remand of Mardell, the Third Circuit
refused to "opine on plaintiffs contentions as to the type or quantum of evidence (such as a
policy or custom) that [the defendant] must adduce to establish that it would in fact have
fired her upon discovering her resume fraud." Mardell, 65 F.3d at 1073 n.3.
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"will deter most abuses. "392 How will those putative safeguards
deter most abuses? The threat of an award of attorney's fees is
hardly new, and will play little or no role when employers intimi
date potential plaintiffs into early settlements or into not suing at
all. As for Rule 1 1 sanctions, the Court's statement is enigmatic:
How can discovery directed at information the Court has deemed
relevant to the limitation of remedies be subject to sanctions?393
In short, the Court's half-hearted attempt to address the "not . . .
insubstantial [concern]"394 regarding employer exploitation of the
Court's treatment of after-acquired evidence does not begin to
address the practical, day-to-day subordination of federal employ
ment discrimination law.395
The McKennon Court's less-than-meticulous attention to a
significant problem created by its decision is in stark contrast to
the plurality's painstaking efforts to allay employers' fears of quota
requirements when, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,396 the
Court extended disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
criteria. To protect employers against quota requirements, the
plurality in Watson was willing to essentially "dismember" the
disparate impact framework. The Court in McKennon makes no
such herculean efforts to protect victims of discriminatory employ
ment practices from a more realistic threat.
Having traced the subordination of federal employment discrimi
nation law to employment at will from Furnco through McKennon,
I next consider the future of discrimination law.
IV. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

Are we willing to expend whatever resources are neces
sary to put an end to workplace discrimination ? Are we
fully committed to the elimination ofdiscrimination even
at the expense of other legitimate concerns ?397

392 McKennon, 1 15 S. Ct. at 887.
393 Davis, supra note 19, at 404.
394

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 887.

Sullivan & Harrick, supra note 19, at 292.
487 U.S. 977 (1988); see also supra notes 150-159 and accompanying
text (analyzing
plurality opinion in Watson).
396

396

397

Gregory, supra note 52, at 68.
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If the Supreme Court does not take the lead in pronouncing that
federal employment discrimination law embodies vital public policy,
that law will continue to become less effective and less meaningful.
Although in the past, supporters of discrimination law have looked
to Congress to overcome unfavorable Court decisions, that will not
be an adequate solution for the current state of affairs. In the
short term, the current Congress does not appear to be favorably
disposed toward federal labor and employment law. Perhaps in the
long term, Congress may react to Supreme Court decisions that
subordinate discrimination law to employment-at-will principles.
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the bills introduced to
overturn Hicks are evidence of this.398
However, Hicks and
McKennon demonstrate that "the Court is inherently more agile
than Congress. "399 As evidenced by the legislative history of both
the 1991 Act and its unsuccessful 1990 precursor, Congress cannot
respond expeditiously enough to adequately protect the rights of
discrimination victims from a multitude of adverse Court deci
sions.400 Congress may try in the future, by giving us "the Civil
Rights Acts of 1998, 2005, and 2010."401 Until the Supreme Court
decides and declares, however, that federal employment discrimina
tion law displaces employment at will and employer prerogatives
to the extent necessary to achieve the goal of eradicating discrimi
nation in the workplace through compensation and deterrence,
there will not be consistent and effective enforcement of that
law.402
In the meantime, the previously discussed decisions of the Court
have not left the lower courts without any choices. For example, in
applying Hicks, lower federal courts can interpret the Court's
holding narrowly. There is nothing in the Hicks opinion that
requires courts to impose a pretext-plus standard in deciding a

398 See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing legislation proposed to overturn
Hicks).

399 Brookins, supra note 69, at 943.
400 Id. at 943-44 (positing Congress "simply cannot respond to each case in a barrage of
judicial attacks on its civil rights legislation").
'01 Culp, supra note 107, at 967.
402
Cf. id. at 1010 ("They will not be the last bills or the last decisions by the Court in this
area as long as the Court is dominated by a conservative majority intent on rewriting
employment discrimination law and committed to avoiding the race question in that effort.").
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defendant's motion for summary judgment. In applying McKen
non's general rules regarding the limiting effects of after-acquired
evidence, courts may interpret the Court's requirement-that an
employer must, in order to use after-acquired evidence, first
establish that it would have terminated the employee on those
grounds alone-as authorizing courts to scrutinize the employer's
assertions carefully and perhaps to evaluate the objective reason
ableness of those assertions. Furthermore, McKennon's authoriza
tion that courts "can consider taking into further account extraordi
nary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of
either party"4°3 remains to be fleshed out by the lower federal
courts.
However, for the lower courts to further eradicate discrimination
within the Supreme Court's framework, or for the Court to develop
a new vision and a new voice to achieve the purposes of federal
discrimination law, judges and justices must re-evaluate their
values and determine that it is appropriate, indeed congressionally
mandated, that employment at will be displaced to the extent
necessary to achieve the goals of employment discrimination law.
Several possibilities explain why judges have decided that
employment discrimination law should be subordinated to employ
ment at will. First, some judges simply believe that the common
law rights flowing from property and freedom-of-contract principles
are more important and more deserving of legal protection. Second,
some judges think it is impossible for the goals of discrimination
law to be achieved, because m arket forces simply cannot be
harnessed by that law. Third, many judges see the burgeoning
caseload of discrimination claims404 and conclude that the courts
cannot effectively handle such a load. Fourth, considering both the
magnitude of the caseload and the types of claims, judges may
conclude that many discrimination claims are meritless. Moreover,
judges may consider the type of discrimination actions (now far
more based on allegedly discriminatory discharge than on refusal
to hire405) and conclude that discrimination law is no longer

: McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 ( 1995).

See generally Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 7 (analyzing growth and
changing
nature of employment discrimination claims from 1960s to
1980s).
406 Id. at 984.
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fulfilling its historic purpose, instead having become a series of
wrongful-discharge statutes protecting only persons in specified
classes. Finally, some judges may believe that invidious discrimi
nation in the workplace is no longer a significant problem.406 The
judiciary must candidly reconsider the foregoing views in light of
the strong public policy manifested in federal employment discrimi
nation law.
Nineteen ninety-four marked the thirtieth anniversary of the
oldest of the federal employment discrimination laws. Thirty years
hence what will we observe? How many civil-rights restoration acts
will there be? What will be the track record of the courts, primari
ly the Supreme Court, in this area of the law? The answers lie in
the resolution of the relationship between the common-law doctrine
of employment at will and the federal employment discrimination
statutes. At this time, the future does not look promising for
federal discrimination law.

406 See Gregory, supra note 52, at 68 ("The federal judiciary has become increasingly
conservative and increasingly sympathetic to institutional concerns. Many judges may feel
that too many discrimination suits are brought and that too many lack a substantial
evidentiary foundation. Some may even believe that discrimination is no longer a significant
societal problem.").

